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NO LONGER BENDING TO THE PURPOSES OF
THE MONEY LENDERS: PROHIBITING THE
"BANK METHOD" OF INTEREST
CALCULATION
ALLAN W. VESTAL*
For nearly two centuries, American banks have employed
the little known but highly lucrative "bank method" of calcula-
tion to determine interest charges on many loans. The method,
which computes yearly interest charges by dividing the annual
interest rate by 360 and multiplying the result by 365, effectively
increases the charges by a fraction of a percent. For individual
borrowers the increase is often nominal For banks, however, the
method nets millions of dollars in annual interest gains. In this
Article, Professor Allan Vestal explores the American judicial
treatment of the "bank method" of interest calculation. Profes-
sor Vestal concludes that although courts have penalized banks
for employing the procedure, its use remains widespread because
case law treating the subject has often failed to provide a mean-
ingful avenue for.relief To correct the problem, Professor Vestal
proposes modifications in the National Bank Act, along with par-
allel changes in related statutes.
This Article explores a failure of the American legal system. Un-
supported by convincing legal or logical justification, banks are diverting
perhaps in excess of one billion dollars annually from their customers
into their own coffers by simply redefining what constitutes a year. By
calculating per diem interest rates using a 360-day year, and then calcu-
lating interest charges using those per diems and a year of 365 days,
banks are able to overcharge their customers. As early as 1824, in one of
the first reported American cases on point, an attorney for a borrower
identified the fundamental issue: Was it true, he asked, that "the laws of
nature and of man must bend to the purposes of the money lender[?]"'
For many banks, the answer is clearly yes.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A.
1976, J.D. 1979, Yale University. The assistance of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washing-
ton and Lee University, is gratefully acknowledged.
1. New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely & Parsons, 2 Cow. 678, 686 (N.Y. 1824) (attorney
Wells arguing for the defendant). At least one earlier American case had noted, but not re-
solved, the issue. See Bank of Alexandria v. Mandeville, 2 F. Cas. 607, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1809)
(No. 850).
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Legal challenges to the bank method of interest calculation present a
story of chronic failure to eliminate this patently unfair banking industry
practice. Although over 150 years ago borrowers prevailed in suits chal-
lenging the bankers' practice,2 subsequent outcomes have been mixed;
the banks have prevailed in odd cases as a result of unusual statutes,
judicial acceptance of transparently false arguments, the reluctance of
courts to impose penalties greatly disproportionate to the offense, and a
misplaced freedom-of-contract analysis.3 More important, while the
practice has been frequently condemned by reviewing courts, banks have
not abandoned the procedure. Generalized regulations and attempts at
class action litigation have in large measure failed to curb the practice
and protect the public.' Therein lies the story and, perhaps, a broader
lesson.
The question is simple: Should banks be allowed to use a method of
interest calculation that surreptitiously, systematically, and deliberately
charges interest over the course of a calendar year in excess of the stated
annual rate? If not, how should the legal system correct its long-standing
failure to protect borrowers from this practice? To answer these ques-
tions, this Article begins by outlining briefly the procedure in question.
The Article then considers various defenses the banking industry tradi-
tionally has offered to support the practice. The Article concludes that
the banks' practice is unjustifiable, considers the litigative and legislative
options for redress, and proposes a legislative solution.
I. GOD ISN'T A BANKER
Had God been a banker, the year might have had 360 days. A 360-
day year divides nicely into four ninety-day quarters and twelve thirty-
day months. Calculating interest is easy at the historically customary
interest rates of six percent, twelve percent, and eighteen percent per an-
num using a 360-day year.' But God did the start-up phase of the uni-
verse without outside financing and, lacking the counsel of bankers,
caused a year to be 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes, and 46 seconds long.6
2. See, e.g., Ely, 2 Cow. at 704; Bank of St. Albans v. Steams, 1 Vt. 430, 431-32 (1829);
Bank of St. Albans v. Scott & Raymond, I Vt. 426, 429 (1829); Bank of Burlington v. Durkee,
I Vt. 399, 404 (1829).
3. See infra notes 31-111 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 112-54 and accompanying text.
5. Using a 360-day year made up of 12 months of 30 days each, the monthly interest at
12% per annum is simply 1% of the balance, 1/2% for a 6% obligation and 1.5% for an 18%
obligation.
6. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 9 (1983). This is a solar year, the period
during which the earth makes a complete orbit around the sun. Although a calendar based on
a sidereal month initially appears attractive to bankers because it uses months of a constant 28-
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Historical responses to the odd length of a year are adverse from the
bankers' perspective. The Egyptians adopted a calendar of 365 days, in-
cluding twelve months of thirty days each and five interstitial days of
celebration.' This result is attractive to banks in that the months are of
equal length, but it is unfavorable because the odd interstitial days are
outside of the months. Julius Caesar took the Egyptian "Nile year" and
rearranged it to have twelve months of twenty-eight, thirty, or thirty-one
days, with no interstitial days, but with leap years.' Julius Caesar's year
had the advantage of eliminating the interstitial days, but the disadvan-
tage of having odd-length months and uneven-length years. Pope Greg-
ory XIII made a minor adjustment of the leap-year cycle to correct the
Julian calendar-not terribly important from the bankers' perspective,
but yet another complication.9 America adopted the Gregorian calendar
in 1752, leaving bankers to ponder the calculation of interest for months
of twenty-eight, thirty, or thirty-one days in years of either 365 or 366
days.
10
At first, bankers attempted to reconcile the divergent goals that
arose from the uneven calendar. On the one hand, they wanted to collect
every penny of interest possible, and thus wanted to charge interest for
365 days in an ordinary year and 366 days in a leap year. On the other
hand, bankers wanted a system that was easy to administer, both in
terms of simplifying the calculation of interest and in standardizing
monthly payments across months of different length. These two goals
proved impossible to accommodate in one interest calculation scheme, so
the bankers developed two.
The first objective of the bankers-collecting every penny of interest
due-was achieved by a method of calculating interest that takes the an-
nual interest rate, divides it by the number of days in the year to produce
a per diem interest rate, and then levies interest for each day based on the
per diem rate. This form of computation is called the "365/365"
day length, the lunar cycle is not precisely 28 days. Indeed, the sidereal calendar would be
even worse for bankers, for it uses a 19-year Metonic cycle, in which all of the months have 28
days, but 7 years have 13 months and the remaining 12 years have only 12 months. Id. at 5.
Of course, a calendar with years differing in length by a full month of 28 days would give new
meaning to the term "per annum."
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id. at 9, 303. Under the Julian calendar every fourth year was a leap year. The
Gregorian formula for leap years is somewhat more complex: a leap year is any year evenly
divisible by 4, unless the year ends in "00" and is not divisible by 400. Thus 1898 was not a
leap year (not divisible by 4), 1900 was not a leap year (divisible by 4, but ends in "00" and is
not divisible by 400), but 2000 will be a leap year (divisible by 4, ends in "00" but is divisible
by 400). Id.
10. Id. at 9.
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method.11 It enables banks to collect every penny due, but requires
somewhat difficult calculations and produces different amounts of inter-
est for months of different length, since interest is charged for each day
and collected for months of different length.
12
The second goal, ease of calculation and level monthly payments,
was achieved by a method of calculation that takes the annual interest
charge, divides it by the number of days in a hypothetical 360-day year to
produce a per diem interest rate, and then levies interest based on a hypo-
thetical thirty-day month. This form of computation is called the "360/
360" method.13 The 360/360 method has the virtue of producing con-
stant payments for months of different length. Its virtue, however, is also
its flaw; when loans cover only parts of years, this formula does not al-
ways collect precisely what would be assessed under the 365/365 formula
because the 360/360 method ignores the variations between months of
different length and the 365/365 method does not.14 Of course, over the
period of a year, the 360/360 and 365/365 methods produce identical
total amounts of interest.15
At this point, some banker got creative. As between the two meth-
ods, the 360/360 method produced a higher per diem interest rate, since
banks divide the same annual interest rate into a smaller number of
pieces (360 as opposed to 365). The 365/365 method, however, provided
more days for which interest could be charged. What would happen, one
can imagine this creative banker asking, if the higher per diem figure of
the 360/360 method was combined with the full daily-count feature of
11. The 365/365 method is also called "exact simple interest." Silverstein v. Shadow
Lawn Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 N.J. 30, 38, 237 A.2d 474, 478 (1968); Robert T. Daunt, Note,
When Statutory Maximum Interest Rate Becomes Usury: Interest Formulas, 6 U. TOL. L.
REv. 541, 541-42 n.5 (1975).
12. For example, given a principal obligation of $10,000 and a 12% per annum interest
rate, the 365/365 method will generate $92.0548 in interest for February ($10,000 X 12% X
28/365), $101.9178 in interest for March ($10,000 X 12% X 31/365), and $98.6301 in inter-
est for April ($10,000 X 12% X 30/365).
13. The 360/360 method is also called "exact simple interest," Silverstein, 51 N.J. at 38,
237 A.2d at 478; "ordinary interest," Daunt, supra note 11, at 541-42 n.5; and "the pure 360-
day year method," Dick West, A Primer on Interest Rate Calculation Methods-Part I: Single
Payment Loans, 9 AM. BANKEnS ASS'N BANK COMPLIANCE J., Winter 1988, at 11, 14.
14. For example, given a principal obligation of $10,000 and a 12% per annum interest
rate, the 360/360 method will yield a constant monthly interest payment of $100 ($10,000 X
12% X 30/360), compared to $92.0548 in interest which the 365/365 method would yield for
February, $101.9178 in interest which the 365/365 method would yield for March, and
$98.6301 in interest which the 365/365 method would yield for April. See supra note 12.
15. Given a principal obligation of $10,000, no principal repayments and a 12% per an-
num interest rate, for example, the 360/360 method will yield an annual interest payment of
$1,200 (12 X $100), as will the 365/365 method (with one month of 28 days, four months of
30 days and seven months of 31 days the total will be (1 X $92.0548) + (4 X $98.6301) + (7
X $101.9178), or $1,200).
[Vol. 70
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the 365/365 method? Banks would lose the administrative convenience
of the 360/360 method's constant monthly payments and easy calcula-
tions, but would maximize interest income.
Thus was created the 365/360 method, or "bank method," of inter-
est calculation. 16 To derive the interest cost for any period, the 360-day
per diem interest charge is multiplied by the actual number of days. Ob-
viously, over the course of a year the 365/360 method produces more
interest than the 365/365 method or the 360/360 method since it takes
the higher 360/360 per diem charge but multiplies it by the 365-day time
period. 7 The increase in the amount of interest charged is a constant
factor of slightly less than 1.4%.18
Absolutely no conceptual justification exists for the 365/360
method.19 No logic supports dividing the annual interest rate by 360 and
16. The 365/360 method is also called "the bankers' customary short year," Commercial
Nat'l Bank v. Connolly, 176 F.2d 1004, 1010 n.2 (5th Cir. 1949) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (re-
ferring to "the bankers' customary short year of 360 days, which only applies in figuring inter-
est that is charged as compensation for the use or detention of money"); "ordinary simple
interest," Silverstein, 51 N.J. at 38, 237 A.2d at 478; "bank interest," Daunt, supra note 11, at
541-42 n.2; and "a bob-tailed, 360-day calendar," 117 CONG. REc. 18,538 (1971) (statement of
Rep. Patman). The 365/360 method "is sometimes erroneously referred to as the 360-day year
[method]." West, supra note 13, at 14.
17. For example, a $10,000 principal obligation at 12%, with no principal repayment, will
generate $1,200 in interest using either the 360/360 or 365/365 method, see supra note 15;
using the 365/360 method it will generate $1,216.6667 ($10,000 X 12% X 365/360).
18. The percentage increase is calculated by multiplying the nominal rate using the 365/
365 method by 365/360 (or 1.0138889). Thus, for a 6% nominal rate (365/365), the 365/360
method yields an effective rate of 6.08333%; for 9% nominal, 9.125% effective; for 12% nomi-
nal, 12.1667% effective; for 15% nominal, 15.2083% effective; and for 18% nominal, 18.25%
effective. At least one commentator has gotten it wrong: "[t]his hybrid [the 365/360 method]
results in a substantial distortion of the nominal interest rate, particularly when it is used to
compute interest for extended payment periods." Richard J. Bronstein, Note, Legal Aspects of
the Use of "Ordinary Simple Interest," 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 141, 141 (1972) (emphasis added).
In actuality, the rate distortion is a constant and does not vary over time.
19. It should be noted that the financial community uses both a 365-day year and a 360-
day year in other contexts, often for no obvious reason. Examples are in daily and continuous
compounding, see Beatson Wallace, Little Difference in Daily and Continuous Compounding,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1989, at 76 (observing that "[d]aily compounding... is based on a
360-day year, while continuous compounding is based on a 365-day year or, in a leap year, 366
days"); repo rates, see William Baldwin, Margins for Error, FORBES, Mar. 12, 1984, at 184,
188 (noting that "repo rates are calculated on a 360-day year"); and banker acceptances,
bonds, and bank notes, see Lynn G. Lindsay, Bankers Acceptances Come into Their Own as
Trade Instruments, AM. BANKING ASS'N BANKING J., Mar. 1984, at 104, 110 (noting that
discount interest on banker acceptances is calculated on 360-day year, while bonds and bank
notes are calculated on 365 days).
Sometimes an obvious reason does exist; some banks collect interest on loans using the
365/360 method and pay interest on deposit accounts using the 365/365 method. American
Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied,
421 U.S. 921 (1975).
The controversy over use of a 365/360 day method is not limited to esoteric questions of
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then multiplying the result by the actual number of days in a year, if the
goal is to calculate payments that add up to the stated annual interest
rate. One banking industry expert has candidly noted as much in an
official American Bankers Association journal:
The 365/360-day year method ... combines elements of the
365/365-day year and the 360/360-day year. But, unlike the
365/365-day year, this method's goal is not accuracy in approx-
imating the exact length of a calendar year. Unlike the 360/
360-day year, its goal is not simplicity in calculation. The goal
of this method is, quite simply, to maximize the amount of in-
terest charged.2"
A Congressional critic was more direct: "[T]his practice could be de-
scribed in many ways, but it comes down to just plain old-fashioned
greed."2
If the banks' goal is in fact to increase interest income, the 365/360
method is simply a surreptitious way to do so. The same result can be
obtained in every case by using the 365/365 method with a marginally
higher interest rate.22 The only reason to use the 365/360 method is that
it allows banks to cozen their borrowers and charge higher-than-agreed-
upon amounts of interest.23 Borrowers think they are borrowing at a
specified rate, but actually they pay nearly 101.4% of the agreed-upon
interest.24
interest calculation. State prisoners in Wisconsin have unsuccessfully sued the State, claiming
that the use of a 365/360 calculation for the determination of release dates is constitutionally
infirm. It comes as no surprise that the trial court denied their claims, reasoning that "using a
standard 360-day year calendar rather than the Gregorian calendar simplifies sentence compu-
tation" and actually worked to the inmates' benefit. Martinez v. Gudmanson, 125 Wis. 2d 92,
93, 370 N.W.2d 814, 815 (Ct. App. 1985). Interestingly, there is no consistency between
prison systems: federal prisons use a 365/365 method of calculation., See FEDERAL BUREAU
OF PRISONS, SENTENCE COMPUTATION MANUAL 7612.1 (1972).
20. West, supra note 13, at 14.
21. 117 CONG. REC. 18,538 (1971) (statement of Rep. Patman).
22. In every case the result using x% under the 365/360 method can be duplicated using
an interest rate of 1.0138889 X x% under the 365/365 method. For example, an 18% nomi-
nal interest rate using the 365/360 method of interest calculation can be expressed as an
18.25% nominal interest rate using the 365/365 method.
23. One banking industry representative confirmed the obvious:
Despite the problems inherent in using the 365/360-day year method, bankers
cling to it tenaciously. I used to suggest that a bank merely raise its interest rates
slightly to generate the additional income the method produces without dealing with
all the attendant problems. The response I invariably got was that, if one could raise
the interest rate to get yet more interest, one could get even yet more interest by
applying the 365/360-day year to that higher rate. And, of course, that response is
correct.
West, supra note 13, at 16.
24. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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The lack of a conceptual or mathematical justification for the bank
method of interest calculation has not stopped the banking industry from
seeking to legitimize the practice. In early litigation challenging the 365/
360 method, bankers argued that the method is consistent with the quo-
tation of a "per annum" interest rate,25 that the difference between inter-
est calculated under the 365/360 method and interest calculated using
the other methods of calculation is de minimis and thus not judicially
cognizable,26 that industry custom and usage authorize the practice,2'
and that administrative convenience justifies the practice.2" More re-
cently, banks have argued that the use of the 365/360 method is simply a
contractual term, either express or implied,29 and that claims of borrow-
ers are barred when banks have complied with disclosure statutes.30
Upon closer examination, each of these defenses is found wanting.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED BY THE BANKS
A. "'A year has 365 days... and no amount ofjuggling the figures or
resorting to rhetoric can change the facts. .... "
The first rationale banks offer for the 365/360 method is both ele-
gantly simple and remarkably audacious. The banks argue that use of
the bank method is proper because the phrase "interest at x% per an-
num" in their advertising and loan documentation does not necessarily
refer to a year of 365 days. It is the type of argument that is plausible
only when uttered in the soothing and solemn voice of an impeccably
dressed senior partner.
Courts typically have addressed this argument in the context of
usury cases, where use of the 365/360 formula with a nominal interest
rate at the legal maximum is alleged to be usurious because over the
course of a calendar year the borrower will pay interest in excess of the
product of the legal maximum rate and the outstanding principal.3" In
the early cases the question often was framed with regard to loans out-
25. See infra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
31. For example, a $10,000 principal obligation at the legal maximum rate of 18% per
annum is supposed to generate $1,800 per calendar year in interest ($10,000 X 18%). Calcu-
lated using the 365/360 method, however, the obligation will result in a five dollar per diem
interest charge ($10,000 X 18% / 360) and thus will generate $1,825 in interest over the
calendar year ($5 X 365). If the $1,800 figure is the maximum interest permissible, then the
interest charged under the 365/360 method is usurious.
1991]
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standing for less than a year, a customary borrowing pattern earlier in
our history.32 Thus, in New York Firemen Insurance Co. v. Ely & Par-
sons,3" the defendant bank charged one-fourth of the statutory maximum
annual interest for a period of time, a fictionalized bankers' quarter of 90
days, which is less than one-fourth of a year.3 4 Attorney Wells properly
framed the argument in 1824:
But is 90 days a quarter of a year? It is so only on the principle
with which the plaintiffs set out, that 30 days make a month.
By what rule of law is this? We have lunar and calendar
months; the one 28, the other a different number of days. If 30
days be the twelfth of a year, then 12 times 30 days are the
year; if not to any other intent, yet the laws of nature and of
man must bend to the purposes of the money lender.35
Wells's position that use of the 365/360 method was improper was con-
sistent with past English practice36 and was adopted by the court.
37
The conclusion of one commentator that "[t]hroughout the remain-
der of the nineteenth century... the position taken in Ely was uniformly
rejected"38 simply does not withstand a critical examination of the
cases.39 One must differentiate between analyses of whether use of the
32. See Bronstein, supra note 18, at 143 (The Bank of North America "limited the maturi-
ties of notes to sixty days in order to avoid risk.").
33. 2 Cow. 678 (N.Y. 1824).
34. Id. at 686-87. The interest for a 90-day period should equal the product of the princi-
pal, the annual interest rate, and 90/365. In this case, the bank charged the product of the
principal, the annual interest rate, and 90/360.
35. Id. at 686 (attorney Wells arguing for the defendant).
36. Id. at 686 & n.(a). Attorney Wells argued for the defendant:
The 3d Dyer, 345 a, pl.5.(a) tells us that the legal year is 365 days; the half year, 182,
and the legal quarter, 91 days.... (a)... by the opinion of the court, the fourth part
of the days of a year, which are 91 days, make a quarter, and to the 6 hours over, the
law pays no regard. And Bendlowes showed an extract from an old book of the
Exchequer, to this end: s. Note, that every quarter of a year contains in it ninety and
one days, which make thirteen weeks; and half a year contains 182 days, but the year
365 days, and 52 weeks ....
Id.
37. Id. at 704. The court wrote:
Was it usurious in consequence of the interest having been calculated upon the sup-
position that 90 days were the fourth of a year, and 3 days the 10th of a month? The
effect of this mode of calculation is to give to the lender interest for 365 days, upon a
forbearance of 360; and where the interest is seven per cent. the amount received,
upon this principle of calculation, will exceed the rate allowed by law.
Id.
38. Bronstein, supra note 18, at 145.
39. The cited commentator, see Daunt, supra note 11, at 549, does acknowledge one case
in which the court explicitly approved and followed Ely. See Haas v. Flint, 8 Blackf. 67, 68
(Ind. 1846) (charging interest equivalent to one-fourth of a year on a 90-day note is usury).
The other cases either do not relate to the 365/360 method of calculation or do not approve
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365/360 method in conjunction with a per annum interest rate at the
legal maximum comports with the statutory limit on interest and analy-
ses of whether such a practice, by itself, can constitute usury. While it is
true that loans using the 365/360 method were routinely found non-usu-
rious-a departure from the result in Ely-it is not true that the inter-
vening courts "effectively condoned"' the use of the 365/360 method in
conjunction with the statutory maximum rate. Rather, some courts im-
posed a more stringent test of intent as an element of usury.41 These
holdings merely show that the use of the 365/360 method was not, alone,
dispositive for all courts on the question of usury.
The intent-sensitive approach to the usury determination in this
the use of the 365/360 method as a substitute for the 365/365 method, but stop short of the
sanctions imposed in Ely. See infra note 43.
40. Bronstein, supra note 18, at 146.
41. The modified intent analysis was basically a question of whether the operational deci-
sion to use the 365/360 method was a sufficient indicium of corrupt intent. Ely and its prog-
eny answered this question in the affirmative. See, eg., Utica Ins. Co. v. Tilman, 1 Wend. 555,
556 (N.Y. 1828) (interest retained on principal calculated with 360 days equalling a year was
prima facie usury); Bank of Utica v. Smalley & Barnard, 2 Cow. 770, 779 (N.Y. 1824) (intent
to "receive interest for 91 days, upon a forbearance of 90, under an erroneous impression that
90 days were the legal fourth of the year... must be considered usurious"); Bank of Utica v.
Wager, 2 Cow. 712, 769 (N.Y. 1824) (365/360 interest calculation "is a direct violation of the
... Statute against Usury"); Ely, 2 Cow. at 705-07 (stating that intent to take interest at a rate
higher than allowed by statute is sufficient for presumption of corrupt intent); Childers v.
Deane & Page, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 406, 412 (1826) (dictum) ("If a mode of calculating interest,
which gives the creditor more than legal interest, is adopted, and the creditor knows it will
have that effect, he is guilty of usury, although he may not suspect he is violating the law
A majority of the reported cases, including at least one case that predates Ely, answered in
the negative. In Bank of Alexandria v. Mandeville, 2 F. Cas. 607, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1809) (No.
850), for example, the court wrote:
[One party argues] that sixty-three days is not two months and one tenth of a month,
but is sixty-three three hundred and sixty-fifths of a year, that is, they do not allow
that a month is to be considered as the twelfth part of a year, nor a day the thirtieth
part of a month.... It is for the jury to say what is the usual mode of calculation in
such cases, and to calculate accordingly. If, however, it were a matter of law, and
not a matter of fact, I should most certainly calculate it according to the mode in
which the clerks in the bank calculated it, because I know that to be the general, I
may almost say the universal, mode of calculation, not only among bankers and
merchants, but in our courts ofjustice. But if it were an error, I should leave it to the
jury to say whether it were not a mistake; and not done with an intent to make more
than the lawful discount.
Id.; see also Bank of St. Albans v. Stearns, 1 Vt. 430, 431-32 (1829) (intent to violate statute
may not be inferred when a bank calculates interest from tables in common use for over 20
years); Bank of St. Albans v. Scott & Raymond, 1 Vt. 426, 429 (1829) (365/360 calculation
"an invariable rule of the bank, [which is] uniformly and publicly followed... [and] affords a
strong presumption that the plaintiffs [intended to conform] to the statute"); Bank of Burling-
ton v. Durkee, 1 Vt. 399, 404 (1829) (365/360 interest calculation is "scarcely intended to
create usury, it has been so long sanctioned by judicial adjudications"); infra note 43 (discuss-
irng further the interest element).
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context was introduced in a series of cases decided by the Vermont
Supreme Court five years after Ely. The Vermont court followed Ely and
rejected the calculation of interest on the 365/360 basis, but refused to
invoke the statutory penalty for usury-forfeiture of the interest and
principal. Instead, the court merely ordered an adjustment of the inter-
est paid. 2 The bank in each case was saved by an absence of corrupt
intent.43
Only one reported case held that the 365/360 method of computa-
42. Durkee, I Vt. at 404 ("[Ihe taking of the twenty-nine cents, as above mentioned, is a
taking of more than the six per cent. allowed by the statute; and that sum ought at least to be
deducted in making up the judgment."); accord Stearns, 1 Vt. at 432; Scott, 1 Vt. at 430.
43. Durkee, I Vt. at 403 (additional interest resulting from the 365/360 method of calcu-
lation taken as excessive interest, corruptly and against the statute, constitutes usury and
avoids note); accord Stearns, 1 Vt. at 431-32; Scott, 1 Vt. at 429.
The absence of corrupt intent was a factor in each of the cases cited by one commentator,
see Bronstein, supra note 18, at 145 & n.25, who has suggested there was "uniform rejection"
of Ely. In Bradley v. McKee, 3 F. Cas. 1156 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 1,784), although it is not
clear from the report whether the case focused on the method of interest calculation or the
addition of a premium for "eastern paper," the intent element was clearly present in the jury
instruction. Over the defendant's citation of Ely, the court instructed the jury
that if from the evidence they shall be of opinion, that, in the years 1833 and 1834,
and for a long time before, it was the usage and custom of the banks and exchange-
brokers, in that part of the state of Virginia in which the town of Wheeling is, to
discount paper at and after the rate of one per cent. for sixty days; and, in addition
thereto, to charge a premium for exchange on eastern paper, varying from an [sic]
half to one per cent. when eastern paper was loaned; and also to charge the same
discount and premium for the renewal of the notes given therefor; and that the said
transaction was bona fide, and not intended as a cloak for usury, this case was not
usurious.
Id. at 1157 (emphasis added). But the court refused to instruct the jury in a way that omitted
the intent component, and did not charge the jury
that, if... the consideration given.., was a loan negotiated by ... any ... person
acting on behalf of the said company; and that the terms of the said loan were one
per cent. for sixty days' discount for forbearance, and one half per cent. for exchange
on eastern funds; and that such was the usage and custom of the banks and ex-
change-brokers in that part of the country where the said loan was made, in the years
1833 and 1834; and that the same rate of discount and premium, or commission, was
charged upon each renewal of such loans, then the said contract was bona fide, and
not usurious.
Id. Thus, to the extent the court even addressed the calculation method issue, it did not repu-
diate the basic Ely analysis.
In Agricultural Bank v. Bissell, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 586, 588-89 (1832), for example, the
court held that if a computational method giving "more than the legal rate" was employed "in
good faith... [it] would not be warranted, from the mere fact that the interest thus computed
slightly exceed[ed] the legal rate, to infer a corrupt and usurious agreement." Id. A similar
rationale was employed in Planters' Bank v. Snodgrass, 5 Miss. (4 Howard) 573 (1840), where
a majority of the court found no usury in the absence of corrupt agreement, id. at 620-22, and
the absence of intention to violate the law, id. at 625-26. See Planters' Bank v. Bass, 2 La.
Ann. 430, 437 (1847) (apparently adopting the Snodgrass majority's corrupt agreement and
intent analysis); Lafayette Bank v. Findlay, I Ohio Dec. Reprint 49, 50 (1844) (including
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tion did not violate the standard for excessive interest, without regard to
the corrupt intent element of usury, or without a statutory justification.
44
In contrast, courts routinely have found interest assessments at the statu-
tory rate based on a 365/360 formula to violate the statutory maximum
rate.4" Thus, the 365/360 method of calculation finds no support in the
usury cases.
Nor does the bankers' initial rationale, that reference to a per an-
num rate does not require the use of a 365-day year, find support in the
cases that depend upon a statutory intention or permission to use other
than a 365-day year. On rare occasions a statute will express a clear
legislative intention to allow the 365/360 method of interest calcula-
tion.4 6 In a small number of cases courts have been able to divine less
element of intent), cited in 47 AM. DIG. Usury § 107 (1904); Parker v. Cousins, 43 Va. (2
Gratt.) 372, 386 (1845) (citing State Bank v. Cowan, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 238 (1837) and Bissell).
In Cowan, the court divided on theory. 35 Va. (8 Leigh) at 246-63. Judge Brockenbrough
declared that "[m]y own opinion always has been that by the calculation the law is violated,
and the contract founded on it... is usurious," but, bowing to custom and usage, allowed the
calculation. Id. at 253. The panel's presiding member, President Tucker, declared that Rowl-
ett's tables "were founded upon the false postulate that the year contained only 360 days in-
stead of 365," but found no intent and thus no usury. Id. at 257-59. Judge Brooke found no
"corrupt intent to commit usury." Id. at 255.
The only other case cited, see Bronstein, supra note 18, at 145 n.25, apparently does not
involve the 365/360 method of calculation, but rather approves the use of the 360/360
method. See Pool v. White, 175 Pa. 459, 474-75, 34 A. 801, 803 (1896) (Although the 365/360
calculation is not the "strict legal rule" unless a particular method of calculation was "spe-
cially agreed upon by the parties, it was not error ... to assume that the mode usual with
bankers was to be pursued.").
44. Merchants & Planters' Bank v. Sarratt, 77 S.C. 141, 144-45, 57 S.E. 621, 622 (1907).
The court wrote:
The law does not stickle over fractional parts of a day in the calculation of inter-
est.... We, therefore, do not rest our conclusion upon the fact that plaintiff did not
intend to take usurious interest, nor upon the fact that it is the custom of banks to so
compute interest, but upon the ground that such standard and reasonably correct
method of calculation for less periods than a year is not unlawful, and was not in-
tended to be overthrown by the usury statute.
Id.
45. See Mohr, Inc. v. Bank of California, N.A., 443 F. Supp. 370, 371 n.6 (D. Or. 1978)
(court without comment recomputes from 365/360 to 365/365 for usury determination);
American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 334 F. Supp. 888, 889 (D. Or. 1971),
aff'd, 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975), aff'd on rehearing, 690
F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982); Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
cerL denied, 365 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); Ditmars v. Camden
Trust Co., 10 N.J. 471, 497-98, 92 A.2d 12, 25 (1952); Ely, 2 Cow. at 704; First Am. Nat'l
Bank v. Hunter, 581 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (awarding borrower $0.70), cerL
denied, 581 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. 1979); Lawler v. Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage Investors, 691
S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1985); O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 691-
92, 586 P.2d 830, 836 (1978) (en bane).
46. See Holisak v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 297 Minn. 248, 250, 210 N.W.2d 413, 414
(1973) (en bane) (noting that statute allows maximum agreed interest of "$8 on $100 for one
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straightforward indications of legislative intent to allow the 365/360
method.4' But there is no support for the argument that the statutes
themselves evidence a general acceptance by the legislatures of the 365/
360 method of calculation.48
Indeed, it is remarkable that parties have even litigated the meaning
of the words "per annum" in this context. After all, "the words ['per
annum'] mean, in Latin, 'by the year.' The ordinary person assumes that
a year, except leap year, has 365 days." 49  A number of courts have
adopted this simple analysis, either consciously5" or without acknowl-
year" and provides that "[i]nterest at the rate of one-twelfth of eight percent for every 30 days
shall not be construed to exceed eight percent per annum"). Of course, that some jurisdictions
have adopted statutes which specifically allow the use of a nonstandard year in some limited
contexts simply indicates that the standard year consists of 365 days.
47. See Voitier v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 514 F. Supp. 585, 593 (E.D. La. 1981)
(en banc) (noting that Louisiana statute allowed a day to be counted as one-thirtieth of a
month and concluding that the Louisiana Supreme Court would, "in accordance with [the
state's] civilian tradition... give greater weight to the probable intent of the Louisiana legisla-
ture" and uphold use of the 365/360 method); THC Fin. Corp. v. Managed Inv. Corp., 64
Haw. 491, 495, 643 P.2d 549, 552-53 (1982) (noting that statute made contracting for, not
collecting, excessive interest illegal, and holding use of the 365/360 method not to violate the
statute); Cotton v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 206 Ind. 626, 630, 190 N.E. 853, 855 (1934)
(noting that variable number of days in a month requires conclusion that "to construe the
word 'month' as meaning calendar month is plainly repugnant to the intent of the Legislature
and the context of the statute, and we must seek the true intent when the provision is consid-
ered in the light of the purpose of the act and its practical application").
Typical of these holdings is State Securities Co. v. Corkle, 191 Neb. 578, 583, 216 N.W.2d
879, 882-83 (1974), in which the court wrote:
Appellee used a 360-day year, relying upon section 8-441, R.R.S.1943, which states:
'For the purpose of computing charges .... a month shall be any period of thirty
consecutive days, and the rate of charge for each day shall be one-thirtieth of the
monthly rate.' Appellants' testimony establishes that the daily interest factor
achieved by use of a 360-day year, when charged for 365 days, produces a return in
excess of 12 percent simple interest. Is such a charge within the contemplation of the
statute? We believe that it is. The term 'year' in section 8-435, R.R.S.1943, is not
further defined in the statute. However, section 8-441, R.R.S.1943, requires that the
daily interest rate be one-thirtieth of the monthly rate. Since interest computed in
accordance with section 8-441, R.R.S.1943, at 12 percent a year, or 1 percent a
month, would divide that monthly rate into thirty equal parts for the purposes of a
daily interest figure, one must assume either that the term 'year' in section 8-435,
R.R.S.1943, contemplates a 360-day year, or that section 8-441, R.R.S.1943, could
allow, on a 365-day year, interest in excess of the stated maximum. Reading the two
sections together, we find that the 360-day method of computing interest used by
appellee, under these statutes, was not usurious.
Id.
.48. Any argument that the statutes evidence such a general acceptance is ultimately un-
availing because of a lack of uniformity in use of the 365/360 method of calculation. See infra
text accompanying notes 76-80.
49. American Timber & Trading Co., 334 F. Supp. at 889.
50. Chern v. Bank ofAm., 15 Cal. 3d 866, 876, 544 P.2d 1310. 1316, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110,
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edgement51 One must sympathize with Arkansas Supreme Court Justice
Purtle, who observed that "[tien per cent per annum means 10% per
year. A year has 365 days, except for a leap year, and no amount of
juggling the figures or resorting to rhetoric can change the facts .... s
B. "The avidity with which a half cent is watched and pocketed shows
no want of care .... "
A second rationale banks offer for the 365/360 method is that,
although the practice of using the 365/360 formula may generate interest
in excess of the nominal per annum figure, the difference is so insignifi-
cant as to be beneath the dignity of the courts. This argument invokes
the legal maxim, de minimis non curat lex, thus adding a patina of legiti-
macy to an otherwise bald position.
3
The de minimis argument has worked, 4 but only rarely.55 Of
course, on one level the argument is attractive: the individual's losses as
a result of the bank method of interest calculation are often insubstan-
tial. 6 Even on the individual level, however, the use of the 365/360
method can have a significant impact. One published report notes that
116 (1976) (en bane); O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 691, 586 P.2d
830, 836 (1978) (en banc).
51. Lawler v. Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage Investors, 691 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1985)
(although statute provided a 10% usury maximum, defendant charged 10% using a 360-day
year; "[i]n other words, interest was charged at the rate of 10.139 per cent per annum").
52. Martin v. Moore, 269 Ark. 375, 379, 601 S.W.2d 838, 841 (1980) (Purtle, J.,
dissenting).
53. The phrase may be translated: "The law does not care for, or take notice of, very
small or trifling matters. The law does not concern itself about trifles." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 482 (6th ed. 1990). See Lastlow v. Thomlinson, 80 Eng. Rep. 237 (1484) (affirming
judgment in assumpsit despite three-farthing variation "because it was not possible in effect to
mince the measure so, as it shall hit the just sum, as the odd hours are not accounted in the
year").
54. See Koos v. First Nat'l Bank, 358 F. Supp. 890, 892 (S.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d
1162 (7th Cir. 1974); Cotton v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 206 Ind. 626, 633, 190 N.E. 853,
856 (1934) (citing Broce v. Master Loan Serv., Inc., 171 Ga. 22, 25, 154 S.E. 324, 325 (1930)).
55. See, e.g., Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466,468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (rejecting
de minimis defense), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979);
New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely & Parsons, 2 Cow. 678, 704 (N.Y. 1824) ("Whether [the]
excess [from use of a 360 day year] be great or small is unimportant; for the least excess is as
much usury as the most enormous.").
56. See First Am. Natl Bank v. Hunter, 581 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)
(awarding borrower $0.70), cert. denied, 581 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. 1979); Bank of St. Albans v.
Scott, 1 Vt. 429, 430 (1829) ("The case shows the taking of about eight cents too much....");
Bank of Burlington v. Durkee, 1 Vt. 399, 404 (1829) (awarding borrower $0.29). In a slightly
different context, the calculation of interest on investments, one author reports that "[a] Cam-
bridge banker informs me that the only difference between daily [360-day year] and continuous
[365-day year or, in a leap year, 366-day year] compounding is the cost of a package of ciga-
rettes." Wallace, supra note 19, at 76.
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when dealing with a loan amortized over twenty-five years, the use of the
365/360 method adds approximately one year to the time required to
fully amortize the principal. 57 At a nominal rate of 18% per annum, the
use of the 365/360 method adds a full 1/4% to the effective interest rate,
making the effective yield 181/4% per annum.-
8
Furthermore, the de minimis argument loses much of its force when
the matter is viewed from the banks' perspective and individual loans are
aggregated. Use of the 365/360 method results in a windfall to banks
equal to slightly less than 1.4% of interest income-not a trifling sum.59
The bank involved in the amortization situation above, for example,
"ended up with $90,000 in interest it was not entitled to," according to
the Solicitor General.' Even more dramatic are the prayers for relief in
class actions that have been filed. 6' In one case from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the class of potential plaintiffs
numbered some 8,600, and a reasonable estimate of the potential liability
of the bank on the 365/360 issue was in excess of $3,500,000 annually.62
The sums involved are anything but triffing when translated to the
national plane. Twenty years ago, Representative Wright Patman, then
chair of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, noted the
"massive overcharges to consumers, homeowners, and businessmen
throughout the Nation" caused by the use of the 365/360 method, and
57. See Bank Board Asks Supreme Court for Power to Stop S&L Overcharges, WA. FIN.
REP., Apr. 5, 1982, at B-3.
58. At 18% per annum the effective interest rate using the 365/360 method is 0.18 X
365/360, or 0.1825.
59. The windfall equals 5/360, or 1/72 (1.3889%) of the interest-income stream.
60. Bank Board Asks Supreme Court for Power to Stop S&L Overcharges, supra note 57, at
B-3.
61. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 1985) (approximately
8,600 potential class plaintiffs); Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 446, 591
P.2d 51, 54, 153 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30 (1979) (plaintiff class numbered over 50,000); Chem v. Bank
of Am., 15 Cal. 3d 866, 871, 544 P.2d 1310, 1312, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (1976) (en bano)
(aggregate claims in excess of $100,000); Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 Il1. App. 3d 784, 788,
305 N.E.2d 236, 242 (1973) ("thousands of individual claims"), appeal dismissed, 60 Ill. 2d
529, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975) (dismissed on recusal of two supreme court justices); Bernard v.
First Nat'l Bank, 275 Or. 145, 148, 550 P.2d 1203, 1207 (1976) ("Plaintiffs estimate that the
borrowers within the class in combined cases number 70,000 and seek a total recovery of
$8,00,000 .... ").
62. Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1196. Of 8,600 in the plaintiff class, approximately 2,800 having
$694,997,218 in loans were induced to opt out of the class. Id. at 1198. Assuming the typical-
ity of the borrowers induced to opt out, the average loan at issue was about $250,000
($694,997,218 / 2,800 = $248,213.29). Calculating on the basis of a 12% per annum interest
figure, each loan would generate $30,000 per annum in interest ($250,000 X 0.12 = $30,000).
Using the 1.4% adjustment figure for excess interest charged using the 365/360 method, the
average loan would be subject to $420 in excess interest charges each year; in the aggregate, the
8,600 class members would be overcharged $3,612,000 each year.
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conservatively estimated the unearned annual wealth transfer from the
public to banks at $145,000,000 63-a figure that would be in excess of
$465,000,000 per annum in 1990 dollars.6 If the same methodology
used by the congressional authority is applied to current commercial loan
balances, the annual estimated loss is more than $940,000,000.65 The
estimate rapidly exceeds one billion dollars when adjustment is made for
contemporary interest rates.66
Thus, perhaps the best reason to reject the de minimis argument is
that the issue is anything but de minimis to banks.67 Attorney Wells
63. 117 CONG. REc. 18,538 (1971) (statement of Rep. Patman). Rep. Patman noted that
assuming
only one-half of the more than $300 billion of loans outstanding by all the commer-
cial banks as of the end of 1970, had the 360-day method applied to them-a quite
conservative figure-the overcharge to the bank borrowers of the country would now
amount to approximately $145 million a year.
Id. The $145,000,000 overcharge figure is calculated using an assumed 50% figure for the
incidence of the 365/360 method, an assumed interest rate of 7%, and the 0.0139 factor for use
of the 365/360 method. See supra note 18. Thus, the calculation is $300,000,000,000 X 0.50
X 0.07 X 0.0139 = $145,950,000.
64. The congressional estimate of $145,000,000 was made in June of 1971, when the con-
sumer price index (CPI) was 40.8 (1982-84=1 00). [3 Labor Relations] Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) V
6627, at 15,010 (Mar. 8, 1991). The CPI for September of 1990 was 131.1. Id. 1 6605. Using
a conversion factor of 3.21323529 (calculated by dividing 131.1 by 40.8), the $145,000,000 in
June of 1971 would equal $465,919,000 as of September 1990. In fact, there is some reason to
believe that the practice is more widespread than a CPI calculation would suggest. The 1971
Federal Reserve study indicated that larger banks tended to use the 365/360 method more
than smaller banks. 117 CONG. REG. 18,539 (1971). One of the questions from the study
suggested by Representative Patman was "whether there is any relationship between the in-
creasing concentration in banking through various means and the use of questionable practices
which cost the public many millions of dollars a year." Id. To the extent there is a correlation
between bank size and the use of the 365/360 method, one would expect the practice to be
more widespread after the last decade of reckless deregulation, savings and loan thievery, hold-
ing company expansion, and interstate banking.
65. See supra note 63. The corresponding commercial bank loan figure for 1988, the most
recent year for which the information is available, is $1,932,300,000,000. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990
table 805, at 496 (110th ed. 1990) (combining line items for real estate loans, commercial and
industrial loans, loans to individuals, farm loans, and other loans and leases). Using the same
50% incidence assumption, the same 7% assumed interest rate, and the constant 0.0139 fac-
tor, the present loss is estimated at $940,064,000 ($1,932,300,000,000 X 0.50 X 0.07 x 0.0139
- $940,064,000).
66. An interest rate assumption of 7%, see supra note 65, is probably too conservative an
estimate for the current mix of bank loans. Using a conservative 10% average, the loss is
$1,342,950,000 ($1,932,300,000,000 X 0.50 X 0.10 X 0.0139). A 12% figure yields
$1,611,540,000 ($1,932,300,000,000 X 0.50 X 0.12 X 0.0139), while 14% results in a
$1,880,130,000 loss ($1,932,300,000,000 X 0.50 X 0.14 X 0.0139).
67. In Kleiner v. First National Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985), the importance of
the use of the 365/360 method to banks was demonstrated by the lengths to which one bank
and its counsel went to quash the claims. In this class action litigation involving a claim based
on the use of the 365/360 method, the federal district court adopted an opt-out provision for
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identified the crux of the issue in 1824: "The plaintiffs may here again
claim the benefit of the maxim de minimis non curat lex, in protection of
their rights, but the avidity with which a half cent is watched and pock-
eted by them, shows no want of care on their part." '68
C. "'It received the universal approbation of mankind.... "
The third justification banks proffer for the 365/360 formula is that
the method has gained legitimacy through custom and usage. This argu-
ment has been flatly rejected by some courts, 69 partially accepted by
others,7" and embraced without apparent difficulty by still others.7
approximately 8,600 potential class members. Id. at 1196. After the district court issued an
order severely limiting contacts with potential class members, counsel for the bank organized a
campaign to contact and convince bank clients to opt out of participation. Id. at 1197-98. The
stakes apparently were high; in fact, one bank loan officer who was an attorney was forced to
resign when he would not participate in the campaign. Id. at 1198 n.90. The campaign was
successful: of approximately 3,000 customers reached, the bank got opt-out commitments
from 2,800 customers, whose loans totalled $694,997,218. Id. at 1198. The district court
found the tactics both coercive and in direct violation of the court's order:
The use of a customer's personal loan officer to solicit an exclusion request from him
is inherently coercive. This does not mean that all customers would be coerced by
such a call from their loan officer. However, many would be. These customers
would include, for example, those who anticipated seeking a note "roll-over," new
loans, extension of lines of credit, or any type of discretionary financial indulgence
from their loan officers, and who did not have convenient access to other credit
sources. To these customers, Defendant's statement that it would not "call" their
loans if they elected to participate in the case is hardly reassuring. Failure to opt out
of a class action is not an event of default under Defendant's note forms. Thus,
injecting the idea of retaliation served no purpose other than to coerce.
Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 F.R.D. 754, 768 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (citations omitted), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985). Because of the intervening settlement,
the Eleventh Circuit was not called upon to rule on attorneys' fees, costs, voidable opt-out
exclusions and cessation of contacts remedies ordered by the district court. Kleiner, 751 F.2d
at 1199. The circuit court did uphold the fines and disqualification of lead bank counsel or-
dered by the district court. Id. at 1210. The court also agreed with the district court that "the
high number of exclusion requests was witness to the inherent coercion of the Bank's machina-
tions." Id. at 1202.
68. New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely & Parsons, 2 Cow. 678, 687 (N.Y. 1824) (attorney
Wells arguing for the defendant).
69. Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 Ill. App. 3d 784, 795, 305 N.E.2d 236, 245 (1973)
(holding that "under no circumstances could the affirmative defense of custom and usage be
maintained"), appeal dismissed, 60 Ill. 2d 529, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975) (dismissed on recusal of
two supreme court justices).
70. In Bank of St. Albans v. Stearns, 1 Vt. 430 (1829), the court used custom and usage in
part to avoid the intent element necessary to find usury, thus allowing an adjustment of the
interest without forfeiture of the principal. Id. at 432. The court wrote:
How numerous must have been the Bank suits, in all the states in the union, where a
similar defence might as well have been interposed as here! Yet, who ever heard of
such a defence, till the case reported in 2 Cowen? A man would as soon be apt to
doubt the correctness of his printed law book, as of his printed interest tables, till
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One can easily understand the frustration of banks that are sued for
following what they thought to be a common industry practice.72 The
custom and usage defense has two central weaknesses, however. First,
no universal custom and usage exist approving the use of the 365/360
formula. Second, banks were put on notice over 160 years ago that the
practice is improper.
Use of the 365/360 formula is not universal. Apparently an Ameri-
can invention, it is contrary to the English rule.73 Is it a rule of general
some incorrectness be shown to him. I have seen Rowlet's [sic] tables much used,
and have no recollection of ever knowing, or suspecting, them incorrect, till on the
present circuit. Many others may have been alike unsuspicious. What should excite
suspicion? We may be jealous of a new invention or an innovation in practice, and be
led to examine its correctness. But, when we are told, and that with truth, that the
tables presented have been in general, and well approved use, for 25 or 30 years, why
go about to correct them? Why refuse to trust them as a guide?
Id. Barely 150 years later, a Florida court rejected reliance on Rowlett's tables, perhaps indi-
cating that the element of surprise had worn thin. Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466,
468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (holding it a usury violation for bank knowingly to charge 10% off of
Rowlett's tables using 360-day year when usury limit is 10%), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 711
(Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
71. See, eg., Martin v. Moore, 269 Ark. 375, 376, 601 S.W.2d 838, 839 (1980) ("We have
no hesitancy in holding, for practical, legal, and historical reasons, that the use of the 360-day
year is lawful even when the interest rate is [the constitutional usury rate]."). The court in
Martin never explained precisely how the payments were calculated, and the method is not at
all clear from the facts presented.
72. The banks' exasperation was shared as early as 1829 by the Vermont Supreme Court:
If a bank commences and carries on its operations in a way pursued by all the banks
in the country, and in the way that has been pursued by them for thirty years, and
even from the first establishment of banks in this country; and uses the same tables
for casting interest, or, to speak more properly, takes the interest from those tables
already cast, for any sum and any term of time, those same being printed tables, and
kept for sale for the accommodation of banks and business men; and, during all this
time, this mode of casting and taking interest has been acquiesced in as correct, and
no resistance made to it in any of the numerous actions, in which the defence might
be made if good in any case-under all these circumstances it cannot be presumed
that they acted with any intention to oppose or violate the statute. In such a case, the
bank would have reason to believe, that the statutes of usury had received a construc-
tion from the bench that sanctioned this mode of casting interest, or at least, that it
received the universal approbation of mankind. The going in a path so well under-
stood, so long in use, and in such general use, precludes all presumption of any inten-
tion to evade the statute, or do any wrong whatever.
Bank of Burlington v. Durkee, 1 Vt. 399, 403 (1829).
73. New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely & Parsons, 2 Cow. 678, 688 (N.Y. 1824) (attorney
Wells arguing for the defendant). Counsel for defense in Ely argued that
the manner of casting interest, disclosed by the case, is peculiar to this country. In
England the rule is the same in all banks, public and private. In the last edition of
Chitty on Bills, 608, 609 and 610, the Court will see the English tables of interest for
years, months and days, which make a distinction between a note payable at 30, 60
and 90 days, and a note payable at 1, 2 and 3 months. The contrary practice, then,
must have originated in this country; and we ask whether it is of such an age as to
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
application in the United States? As recently as 1980, the Arkansas
Supreme Court, without any citation or apparent evidence, determined
that "the 360-day year is so uniformly used in the commercial world that
no one has thought to question it."'74 In the mid-1930s the Indiana
Supreme Court, based on third-party calculation aids, found that there
was general agreement on the 365/360 method in one limited segment of
the financial services industry." The weight of modem authority, how-
ever, is clearly to the contrary-that no custom and usage legitimize the
365/360 formula. In the leading modem case, American Timber & Trad-
ing Co. v. First National Bank,7 6 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit found on the basis of nationwide surveys that
"although the 365/360 method is used there is no definite, uniform, long-
established custom."" The court relied upon the opinion of Representa-
tive Wright Patman, an acknowledged authority in banking affairs:
[Use of the 365/360 method] is not standard or uniform in any
way. It varies among banks with respect to the types of loans
or maturities of loans subjected to the practice. It varies even
in many instances within the same bank with respect to the
type of loans and maturity of loans to which the practice is
applied, and it varies significantly from one part of the country
to another.78
Similarly in the landmark case Kleiner v. First National Bank,79 the court
held that the evidence supplied by the defendant bank also failed to es-
tablish a trade meaning for "per annum."80
sanction a violation of law? There is no doubt of the intent to swell the amount of
interest beyond what is strictly legal, and the court cannot relieve against a mistake
of the law.
Id. (attorney Wells arguing for the defendant).
74. Martin, 269 Ark. at 377, 601 S.W.2d at 839.
75. Cotton v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 206 Ind. 626, 630, 190 N.E. 853, 855 (1934) ("It
is a well-known fact that in commercial circles certain recognized tables are used in the com-
putation of interest, and that in these tables 360 days are treated as a year."),
76. 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
77. Id. at 984 n.3. The court explained: "The bank contends it relied upon industry
custom.... [We doubt the existence of such custom .... ." But see Bronstein, supra note 18,
at 143 ("The 365/360 method has been the standard method of interest calculation in the
banking industry for the last two centuries.").
78. American Timber, 511 F.2d at 984 n.3 (citing 117 CONG. R~c. 18,539 (1971) (state-
ment of Rep. Patman)).
79. 581 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
80. Id. at 962. Affidavits of nonparty Atlanta bankers offered by defendant bank indi-
cated "that the 365/360 method of interest calculation is one of several generally recognized,
customarily accepted methods of computing interest in the banking industry." Id. The court
found that
the affidavits tendered by the bank fail to support any conclusion that the term "per
annum" has a trade meaning or that any trade custom applies which would reveal
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In actuality, different types of financial institutions have adopted dif-
ferent methods of interest calculation and handle different types of loans
differently.81 Even banks involved in litigation are not internally consis-
tent, often treating one class of commercial loans differently from an-
other.8 Interest accruing on loans is also treated differently from
interest accruing on deposit accounts.83 One bank attorney has even re-
ported that his bank used different methods for calculating interest on
identical loans; the treatment the customer got depended on which com-
puter was used to calculate the interest."
Finally, to the extent custom and usage were ever a viable argument,
it ceased to be compelling early on. The custom and usage defense was
unambiguously rejected in New York in 1824." In 1829 the Vermont
the true meaning of the phrase "per annum." Indeed, the affidavits suggest the ab-
sence of a common meaning for the term "per annum," rather than the existence of a
common meaning.
Id.
81. 117 CONG. REc. 18,539 (1971). Even within a single bank, there are often variations
in the use of the 365/360 practice. See Federal Reserve Bank Surey on Calculating Interest
Charges on Loans, 117 CONG. REC. 18,540-45 (1971) (among 191 banks using the 365/360
method, none apply method for all types of loans and maturities). In Silverstein v. Shadow
Lawn Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 N.J. 30, 237 A.2d 474 (1968), the court noted surveys showing
that an overwhelming number of commercial banks, savings banks, and insurance companies
used the 360/360 or 365/365 method for computing interest on long-term monthly payment
mortgage loans. Id. at 37, 237 A.2d at 478. The court also acknowledged, however, that the
365/360 method was the "general practice of banks with respect to short-term and demand
loans, construction mortgages, and commercial loans secured by mortgage." Id. at 38, 237
A.2d at 478.
82. Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 Ill. App. 3d 784, 794, 305 N.E.2d 236, 244 (1973)
(finding "manifestly unacceptable" assertion that interest statute means 360-day year when
applied to commercial loans and 365-day year when applied to other loans), appeal dismissed,
60 Ill. 2d 529, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975) (dismissed on recusal of two supreme court justices).
83. American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir.
1974) (365/365 method used to compute interest to depositors), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921
(1975); see also 117 CONG. REc. 18,539 (1971) (noting that banks borrow short-term funds
from the Federal Reserve System and pay interest to their depositors on basis of 365-day year).
Interestingly, prior to deregulation, some thrift institutions used the 365/360 year in the
deposit context when such use favored the customer, "to make the Regulation Q [governing
maximum interest rates on deposit accounts] differential over what banks could pay as large as
possible." Paul S. Nadler, Cost-Cutters Look at Banks' "Small' Expenses, AM. BANKER, Aug.
25, 1986, at 4.
84. West, supra note 13, at 12. The bank attorney stated that he entered a sample loan on
each of several calculators and found that "for the same loan, the seven calculators gave me six
different payment amounts and finance charges .... Bank officials had no explanation for the
disparity. In fact, they were not even aware a disparity existed. The difference, of course, was
that each calculator used a different interest calculation method." Id.
85. New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely & Parsons, 2 Cow. 678, 707 (N.Y. 1824). The
court observed:
That the principle of calculation adopted by the plaintiffs, was the one in general or
universal use among banks, cannot alter the law of the case. A statute cannot be
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Supreme Court found that the use of the 365/360 method was "the uni-
form course of business" at least at the defendant bank, required an ad-
justment of the interest paid to conform to the usury statute, and
concluded: "[W]e wish it fully understood, that the bank must change
their mode in the future, or they will act with their eyes open. '"86 The
banks have been operating for over 160 years with their eyes purposely
closed. The defense of custom and usage should not be given continued
effect.
8 7
D. "The intention only of expediting the computation .... "
The next rationale banks have offered to justify the bank method is
that interest is made easier to calculate by using this method. This argu-
ment proved persuasive in some of the earlier cases."' The clear weight
of modem authority rejects the ease-of-computation argument, because
the evaluation should be made on the basis of the effect on the borrower
and not on inconvenience to the lender, and because any computational
benefit to banks from the use of the 365/360 method has been eliminated
by the use of computers.89
abrogated by custom or usage of a particular trade. In Dunham v. Gould, (16 John.
367 (1819)), which was also a case of usury, Chancellor Kent says, "The custom of
merchants is not applicable to such a case. It is not a matter of trade and commerce
within the meaning of the law merchant; and if there were such a local usage, it
would be null and void, and could not be set up as a cover or pretext to trample down
the law of the land. The money lenders throughout the country might as well set up
a custom of their own, and then plead it in bar of the Statute."
Id. (quoting Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367, 374-75 (N.Y. 1819)).
86. Bank of St. Albans v. Scott, 1 Vt. 426, 429-30 (1829).
87. The Hawaii Supreme Court has found that although "[t]he 365/360 method of com-
puting interest has been a standard method of the banking industry for the past two centuries"
and "[t]he majority of early cases... held that computational convenience and banking cus-
tom justified the use of the 365/360 method," because of changes in the industry, including the
use of computers, "the rationale of the earlier cases is no longer persuasive to all courts."
THC Fin. Corp. v. Managed Inv. Corp., 64 Haw. 491, 494, 643 P.2d 549, 551-52 (1982) (citing
Bronstein, supra note 18, at 145-50).
88. See, eg., Martin v. Moore, 269 Ark. 375, 376, 601 S.W.2d 838, 839 (1980) ("We have
no hesitancy in holding, for practical, legal, and historical reasons, that the use of the 360-day
year is lawful even when the interest rate is [the constitutional usury rate]."); Cotton v. Com-
monwealth Loan Co., 206 Ind. 626, 633, 190 N.E. 853, 856 (1934) (holding that when the
computational method is used with "the intention only of expediting the computation or fol-
lowing a convenient business practice, the contract will not be held usurious").
89. THC Fin. Corp., 64 Haw. at 494, 643 P.2d at 551-52. The THC court noted:
The 365/360 method of computing interest has been a standard method of the bank-
ing industry for the past two centuries. The majority of early cases refused to hold
that interest resulting from the use of the 365/360 method at the maximum legal
rates is usurious. These cases held that computational convenience and banking cus-
tom justified the use of the 365/360 method. But interest is now calculated by com-
puters, and the rationale of the earlier cases is no longer persuasive to all courts. In
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The fundamental flaw in this rationale for the 365/360 method is
that the ease or difficulty of calculation is not in any sense a legal de-
fense. 90 Banks seem to muddle through complicated calculations when it
is in their interest to do so,91 and it does not seem appropriate to allow a
bank to structure the transaction and then plead that it is unable to fulfill
its clear commitment because of internal bookkeeping difficulties.
In support of the ease-of-calculation argument, banks have asserted
that the published, standardized charts used by the banking industry are
based on the 365/360 method of calculation.92 Thus, banks argued that
they were faced with two alternatives: either use the standardized
charts-and with them the 365/360 method--or use another method of
calculation and be forced to do the individual computations by hand
without the assistance of standardized charts. This attempt to justify the
bank method is unavailing for three reasons. First, the argument finesses
the certainty that new charts could have been published using a different
formula. Second, recent investigation has revealed that "almost all banks
used Rowlett's Tables to compute interest, and the Tables were not
designed to yield interest readily on the 365/360 basis."9 3 Third, the
proper reading of the standardized charts is moot, because the use of
American Timber & Trading Co. v. First National Bank of Oregon, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying Oregon law, found that the bank's
use of the 365/360 method of computation was usurious and agreed with the district
judge's determination that the usury statute "should be construed with regard to its
net effect upon the borrower rather than upon the bookkeeping burden, custom, or
convenience of the lender." American Timber has been followed by most courts who
have subsequently considered this issue.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d
980, 983 (9th Cir. 1974), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975)).
90. American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 334 F. Supp. 888, 889 (D. Or.
1973) ("The legislative intent in enacting usury laws is to protect borrowers from paying exces-
sive interest. Usury legislation is a form of consumer legislation. It should be construed with
regard to its net effect upon the borrower rather than upon the bookkeeping burden, customs,
or convenience of the lender."), aff'd, 511 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 921
(1975).
91. American Timber, 511 F.2d at 983-84 ("The bank contends that the use of a 365/365
method creates difficult computations and, therefore, for reasons of convenience the banking
community considers it proper to use the simpler 365/360 method.... The court noted that
the bank used the 365/365 method to compute interest it paid to its depositors.").
92. Bank of St. Albans v. Stearns, 1 Vt. 430, 432 (1829).
93. Bronstein, supra note 18, at 143-44. In a more benign reading, another commentator
observes:
Rowlett's tables used two methods of calculating interest; the first, which Rowlett
called the "bank interest," was based on the 365/360 method, but in his 1831 edition
of the tables he also included what he called the "lawful, or statute interest." This
latter interest was based on the 360/360 method and the 365/365 method.... [A]
bank made an active policy decision to increase its returns for any given rate of
interest when it selected the bank interest method of using the tables. The tables
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computers in banking operations has made charts obsolete. Although
one nimble lender alleged that the use of computers made it harder to
calculate interest to avoid usury limitations,94 the advent of computers
has removed whatever force remained in the ease-of-calculation
argument.
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Even beyond the adoption of computers, the ease-of-calculation ar-
gument is rightly dismissed because it simply is not true. The 360/360
method has computational advantages over both the 365/360 and 365/
365 methods because of the use of fictional months of even length. But
the use of an actual-days numerator-as is the case with both the 365/
365 and 365/360 day formulas-makes computations using these formu-
las equally difficult because interest is calculated by multiplying the
number of days in the period by the per diem interest charge. It does not
matter significantly whether the daily interest charge is 1/365 or 1/360
of the per annum interest amount.9 6 Indeed, it is this fact that stands
behind a remarkable New Jersey case in which the bank unsuccessfully
themselves provided both methods in an easily accessible form... [and] they sup-
plied the banking industry with the information it wanted.
Daunt, supra note 11, at 554-55.
94. O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 683, 586 P.2d 830, 832
(1978) ("Later ... all accounts of the two entities were integrated into one computer system.
Defendant alleges that the system could not practically be programmed to extend different
rates of interest to Washington residents.").
95. American Timber, 511 F.2d at 984 ("Any claim by the banking industry that ease of
calculation is justification for exacting higher interest is of dubious validity in this age of com-
puter technology."). In fact, the results of a Federal Reserve System study in the early 1970s
lead one to question whether the justification ever had any force.
As a practical matter, the larger banks are in a much better position to do away with
such a questionable practice than smaller banks because of the greater availability to
them of sophisticated data processing and computer equipment. It is ironic, there-
fore, that the smaller banks in the country are taking advantage of the public far less
in this matter than the larger banks.
117 CONG. Rac. 18,539 (1971) (reporting results of informal survey of American banks by
Rep. Wright Patman and the Federal Reserve System).
96. One commentator came to the fallacious conclusion that "[m]anual calculation for the
365/365 method is more difficult than for the 365/360 method." Bronstein, supra note 18, at
143 n.13. The problem with the argument is that it is wholly dependent on the nominal inter-
est rate selected. The commentator conveniently chose a nominal annual rate of 12%. Id. If
one selects a nominal annual rate of 9.125%, another commercially standard rate, the results
are reversed; the 365/360 method results in a per diem rate of 0.00025347 (0.09125 / 360)
while the 365/365 method results in a per diem rate of 0.00025 (0.09125 / 365), obviously a
much easier figure with which to calculate. Of course, neither mode of calculation has an
advantage at the vast majority of possible interest rates, because they are equally cumbersome
to use. Moreover, whatever calculation advantages occur at a few points on the continuum are
eliminated by the use of computers.
Indeed, in one case the bank witness testified (and the court found) that there was no
advantage in terms of ease of calculation with either the 365/365 or 365/360 method (true) or
with the 360/360 method (untrue for a fixed principal, amortizing loan). See Voitier v. First
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argued that it was justified in moving from a 360/360 method to a 365/
360 method, and thereby increasing the amount of interest charged to its
customers, because with the introduction of computers it could do the
more complicated computations required by the 365/360 formula.97
E. "The parties have contracted ...."
The final justification banks offer for the 365/360 method is that the
meaning of the phrase "x% per annum" is a matter of contract negotia-
tion and can be made consistent with the use of the 365/360 method; in
other words, a year does not have to have 365 days if the parties prefer
that it have fewer.98 The contract analysis requires the critical factual
assumption that the adoption of a formula for interest calculation is a
point of contract negotiation. 99
Nat'1 Bank of Commerce, 514 F. Supp. 585, 592 (E.D. La. 1981). Perhaps the witness meant
that with the use of computers the calculation is equally easy for all the humans involved.
97. Silverstein v. Shadow Lawn Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 N.J. 30, 36, 237 A.2d 474, 478
(1968).
98. First Empire Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 634 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981). In First Empire, the court found that "the use of the 360-day
basis was an advantage to the lender, secured by special provision of the letters of credit." Id.
Absent such a provision, the court held, "interest would ordinarily be computed on the basis of
the physical fact that a 'year,' for the purposes of interest or otherwise, is an actual year of 365
days." Id.
A slight variation is to assume that the 365/365 method and the plain meaning of the
term "per annum" are to be used absent a contrary contract provision. See Shadow Lawn Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 51 N.J. at 39, 237 A.2d at 481. The Shadow Lawn court wrote:
It is elementary that interest as compensation for the use, detention or forbearance of
money is a matter of contract. The contract includes the method of computation,
expressed or legally implied. Where the obligation is to extend for more than a year
and the instrument sets forth nothing more than that the debt shall bear interest at a
specified rate-with or without the addition of the phrase "per year," "per annum"
or the like, we hold that the intention of the parties must legally be taken to be that
interest shall be computed only by either the 365/365 or the 360/360 method.
Id. (citations omitted).
99. A variation on the pure contractual analysis is the argument that the context in which
the term "per annum" is found alters its meaning-in effect, a finding that a year does not have
365 days if the context requires otherwise:
[T]he method of interest calculation envisioned by the parties is not revealed in the
"usual and common signification," of the phrase. The dictionary meaning of "per
annum" is "in or for each year," WEBsTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(1979); "by the year; annually; yearly," BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
Thus, a promise to pay interest "per annum" is simply a promise to pay at an annual
interest rate. This does not obligate the lender to use any particular method of inter-
est computation. Nor does it restrict the amount of interest that can be charged to
the amount that accrues when interest is calculated daily for 365 days. Although
"[w]hen the period of a 'year' is named [in a contract], a calendar year is generally
intended ... the subject-matter or context... in which the term is found or to which
it relates may alter its meaning." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
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In First American National Bank v. Hunter, "c for example, the Ten-
nessee Court of Appeals, without any supporting evidence, indulged in
the speculation that "there is no reason why a borrower could not induce
the bank to make his loan by agreeing that interest be computed upon a
360-day year."101 It is theoretically possible that a borrower could seek
to induce a bank to make a loan based in part on the method of interest
calculation. As a predictor of human behavior, however, such an as-
sumption is wildly counterintuitive for at least five reasons. First, as at
least one court has found, one fairly may assume that when negotiating
for a loan borrowers focus on the monthly payment amount rather than
on the complex calculations required to calculate the payments.10 2 Sec-
ond, even if the interest-formula language is included in the note, and
often it is not, 10 3 it is unlikely to be adequate to specify the 365/360
method, because of either the obscure location" 4 or the imprecise con-
tent of the disclosure.105 Third, even if the language does provide suffi-
cient notice, typical borrowers do not understand the significance of the
Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 581 F. Supp. 955, 962-63 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
100. 581 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 581 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. 1979).
101. Id. at 659.
102. See Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 267
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) ("In a transaction of this nature, it defies
common sense to believe that the parties were more intent on specifying one method under
which interest was to be calculated than they were on agreeing on the amount of monthly
payments .... ").
103. 117 CONG. REc. 18,539 (1971). A Federal Reserve System study of the issue has
disclosed that
[a]s many as 86 of the 191, or almost 45 percent of the responding banks who use this
practice, do so without disclosure of any kind to their borrowers. This is a shocking
example of a lack of integrity among institutions who are constantly seeking the trust
and confidence of their customers and Congress by advertising their honesty and
reliability.
Id. (citing informal survey of American banks by Rep. Wright Patman and the Federal Re-
serve System).
104. Gulf Fed Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 267 ("The sentence calling for the 365/360
method of calculating interest was located in the midst of complicated text of the loan agree-
ment, and apparently was ignored by all but one borrower ....").
105. Parties frequently are less than precise in specifying language adequate to describe the
365/360 formula. For example, the phrases "360 day annual rate of interest," Haas v. Pitts-
burgh Nat'l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 604, 610-11 (W.D. Pa. 1973), and "360-day simple interest ba-
sis," Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank, 703 F.2d 1220, 1221 (11th Cir. 1983), seem clearly
insufficient to differentiate between the 365/360 method of calculation and the 360/360
method. Contra Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11 th Cir.
1985) (language to effect that "[i]nterest is arrived at by the normal formula-Principal x Rate
x Time on a 360 day year basis" deemed "[a]ll information necessary to calculate the margin
interest").
Of course, precision occasionally is obtained. See St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Intermedics,
Inc., 612 F. Supp. 958, 965 (D. Minn. 1985) ("[I]nterest... shall be computed on the basis of
actual days elapsed and a year of 360 days.").
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term designating the interest calculation method. 06 Fourth, even if bor-
rowers note and understand the choice of formula, within these transac-
tions borrowers almost always are unable to negotiate the point given
their unequal bargaining power.1 7 Finally, if the borrower truly wanted
to use the prospect of increased interest to induce the bank to make a
loan, a simple and mathematically indistinguishable method by which to
do so would be simply to increase the interest rate.
Certainly if the interest calculation term were a point of negotiation,
one would find some variation in the language employed from file to file.
But these cases are remarkable for the lack of any claim of such varia-
tion. Of course there are no variations of the banks' preprinted forms;
there is no negotiation on this point. Thus, as a practical matter, it is
reasonable to assume that banks use the 365/360 method as a deception,
not that borrowers use it as an inducement. It is used precisely because it
is not an agreed-upon term.
In actuality the contract analysis is important to the banks not be-
cause it allows the banks to win on the merits; typically it does not. In-
stead, use of the contract analysis with respect to the 365/360 method of
interest calculation creates a fundamental procedural problem for pro-
spective plaintiffs seeking to configure the litigation as a class action. If
the interest calculation method is theoretically a point of negotiation and
agreement, then it must be true that the language of the agreement can
vary and that the intention of the parties is relevant. Thus, individual-
ized proof is required for each plaintiff to distinguish any variations in
the language of the contract and to establish the intent of the parties.108
106. See Chern v. Bank of Am., 15 Cal. 3d 866, 872, 544 P.2d 1310, 1316, 127 Cal. Rptr.
110, 116 (1976) (holding that bank method of interest calculation constitutes false and mis-
leading advertising under Business and Professions Code).
107. An anecdotal piece of evidence may be helpful on this question. I once raised the use
of the 365/360 method of interest calculation while negotiating an initial credit facility in an
amount well in excess of $50,000,000 from a syndicate of large domestic and foreign banks for
an extremely creditworthy and well-secured commercial borrower. I suspect that to the extent
any borrower ever had leverage on this point, this client did. The response of the lenders was
to state that they never vary their policy of using the 365/360 method on credit facilities of the
type involved, that to do so would cause them substantial operational difficulties, and that the
point was not negotiable. Although the lenders made numerous significant concessions on
other points, some representing sums of money several magnitudes greater than the direct out-
of-pocket cost of moving from the 365/360 method to the 365/365 method, the 365/360
method remained.
108. The procedural advantage conferred by recourse to parol evidence tempts banks to
make some fairly bizarre arguments. In Perlman v. First National Bank, 15 Ill. App. 3d 784,
791, 305 N.E.2d 236, 242 (1973), appeal dismissed, 60 Ill. 2d 529, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975) (dis-
missed on recusal of two supreme court justices), for example, the bank cited the Illinois Inter-
est Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, paras. 9-10 (1971), to argue that the statute was ambiguous,
so as to allow parol evidence of each borrower's understanding. The first section provided that
when a "certain rate of interest is... mentioned, and no period of time is stated for which such
1991]
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Not even the absence of variation in loan agreements has deterred banks;
they simply argue either that the standardized language is itself subject to
varying interpretations on the part of the borrowers,1°9 or that the stan-
dardized language does not mean what it says.' 10 In either event, indi-
vidualized proof is required. Of course, the individualized proof
requirement does not itself preclude class action litigation; it is only when
the individualized issues are found to predominate over the general issues
that the class action becomes inappropriate."' Still, the contractual
rate is to be calculated, interest shall be calculated at the rate mentioned, by the year, in the
same manner as if 'per annum' or 'by the year' had been added to the rate." Id. para. 9. The
second section provided that "[i]n all computations of time, and of interest and discounts, a
month shall be considered to mean a calendar month, and a year shall consist of twelve calen-
dar months." Id. para. 10. The Perlman court rejected the statutory argument when it noted
that the bank-relying on the same statutory provision--calculated interest on commercial
loans differently than other loans, a "manifestly unacceptable" conclusion. Perlman, 15 I11.
App. 3d at 794, 305 N.E.2d at 244.
109. See Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 447, 591 P.2d 51, 55, 153
Cal. Rptr. 28, 31 (1979). The trial court in Fletcher found that the bank had "freely explained
its method of interest computation when asked, and that the practice of computing interest on
the basis of a 360-day year had been followed for many years." Id. at 448, 591 P.2d at 55, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 32. Given this fact, the "individual issues of knowledge predominated over the
common questions of law." Id. Finally, "the class was not readily ascertainable, and conse-
quently ... the action should not be maintained as a class action." Id. The appellate court
concluded that these findings did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id.
110. The second variation is found in Bernard v. First National Bank, 275 Or. 145, 154,
550 P.2d 1203, 1210 (1976). Bernard involved an estimated class of 70,000 borrowers seeking
a total recovery of $8,000,000. The plaintiffs contested the need for "separate adjudications as
to individual class member's knowledge of the 365/360 computation practice," id., asserting
"that any attempt to show that 'per annum' refers to 360 days would vary the written contract
and evidence thereof would be inadmissible because it would violate the parol evidence rule."
Id. (footnotes omitted). The court explained that
[i]t is well settled that the parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence offered to aid
the court in its interpretation of the language chosen by the parties. Furthermore,
ORS 42.250 sets forth the principles governing the interpretation of language and
expressly authorizes the introduction of evidence to show that the words employed
have a 'technical, local or otherwise peculiar signification.' . . . Therefore, parol evi-
dence would be admissible to show that individual borrowers knew of the 'technical'
meaning employed by the bank ....
Id. at 155, 550 P.2d at 1210.
In First American National Bank v. Hunter, 581 S.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 581 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. 1979), the court held that while "(t]he phrase
'interest at -% per annum' does unequivocally indicate that -% of the principal shall consti-
tute the interest charge for a year... the phrase does not indicate the exact manner in which
interest shall be computed for less than a year." Id. at 658. The court concluded that "[t]his
uncertainty of detail (latent ambiguity) must be resolved by inquiry regarding the actual intent
of the parties as to the meaning of the words used by them." Id.
11. See, eg., Fletcher, 23 Cal. 3d at 448, 591 P.2d at 55, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 31; Kleiner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 97 F.R.D. 683, 691 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("The existence of individual questions
concerning class members does not necessarily defeat the commonality requirement.... [The
applicable rule] requires only that common questions predominate, not that they be
unanimous.").
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myth has made the certification of class actions challenging the 365/360
method of calculation significantly more difficult.
III. "IT WOULD BE UNSOUND AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY
Given that banks improperly use the 365/360 method of interest
calculation to cozen borrowers into paying inflated interest charges, it is
clear that neither the American legal system nor the various banking reg-
ulators have effectively addressed the practice. Questions arise how these
systems have failed in this regard, for fail they most assuredly have, and
how the failures should be corrected.
A. Litigation
To be effective, a litigation-based challenge to the use of the 365/360
method must accomplish two objectives. First, it must transcend the ec-
onomics of the individual claim. This strategy is necessary because the
recovery for a typical borrower is insufficient to justify the costs of litiga-
tion.112 Second, an effective litigation strategy must secure a broadly ap-
plicable judicial condemnation of the 365/360 method, thereby forcing
an industry-wide abandonment of the practice.
The requirement of broad applicability suggests proceeding on
either a common-law or federal cause of action, and not a state statutory
cause of action. 3 Unfortunately, federal law does not prohibit the bank
method.114 The common law also fails to provide a clear legal basis for a
112. Another theoretical option would be to find an atypical plaintiff with an individual
claim large enough in its own right to warrant litigation. This approach is rejected for several
reasons. A plaintiff substantial enough to have such an individual claim presumably also
would have a greater knowledge of banking procedures and thus would be open to additional
defenses under some substantive theories. Such a plaintiff also would be a less sympathetic
party, and would have more to risk by disrupting its existing banking relationships.
113. Given statutory differences between the states, a statutory suit might have limited
applicability. See, eg., Chem v. Bank of Am., 15 Cal. 3d 866, 876, 544 P.2d 1310, 1316, 127
Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (1976) (dealing generally with a state credit statute).
114. In Waters v. Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Co., 582 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1978), the
court held that the use of a 360-day year, in at least some contexts, does not violate the federal
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-14, 1631-46, 1661-65(a), 1666(j), 1667(e) (1988),
because "[t]he legislative history, applicable portions of the Act, and appropriate Nevada stat-
utes support the conclusion that the interest computation method was lawful." Waters, 582
F.2d at 506. For a discussion of the Truth in Lending Act, see infra note 143. Nor is use of
the 365/360 method of calculation a violation of federal banking laws. See infra notes 155-59
and accompanying text.
Title IX of the Organized Crime and Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988), better
known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or "RICO," has been
advanced with some success to provide a substantive theory allowing larger than compensa-
tory damages. See Morosani v. First Natl Bank, 703 F.2d 1220, 1222 (1lth Cir. 1983)
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challenge to the 365/360 method. One common-law possibility is an ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty or confidential relationship by a bor-
rower being charged interest under the 365/360 method. 15 Although to
prosecute such an action successfully the plaintiff must distinguish the
case from the general rule that "there is not a fiduciary relation between
debtor and creditor as such,"' 1 6 the general rule is not without excep-
tions.117 One might argue, for example, that "special circumstances"
1 18
exist in the 365/360 situation because the bank knows or has reason to
know that the typical customer does not understand the calculation of
interest to be anything but a purely administrative function and that the
typical customer is placing trust and confidence in the bank to apply
payments correctly.
A second possible common-law action to challenge the bank method
is an action in fraud. There are two basic subtypes of such a claim:
fraudulent misrepresentation 19 and tortious nondisclosure.'
20
An action for fraudulent misrepresentation requires proof of "a mis-
representation of fact.., for the purpose of inducing another to act...
in reliance upon it," justifiable reliance by the borrower, and damages. 121
The fact misrepresented in this situation would be the effective interest
("Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the Bank had engaged in a scheme to obtain money by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses and representations. Obtaining money by false pre-
tenses, if proved, clearly falls within the traditional definition of criminal activity ..... (foot-
note omitted)). This Article does not pursue the RICO option because of the Supreme Court's
evident hostility toward the expansive use of civil RICO, and the efforts to reform RICO to
narrow its use. See, eg., Geoffrey Aronow, In Defense of Sausage Reform: Legislative
Changes to Civil RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 964, 966 (1990) (noting that the Supreme
Court has stated that if there were defects in civil RICO, they were inherent in the statute as
written and must be corrected by Congress).
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977) ("One standing in a fiduciary
relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of
duty imposed by the relation.").
116. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12 comment b (1957); see, e.g., Klein v. First
Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 422, 196 N.W.2d 619, 623 (1972) (finding no special duty to
counsel absent special circumstances in transaction between bank and customer).
117. See, eg., Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Iowa 1986) ("Because the cir-
cumstances giving rise to a fiduciary duty are so diverse, any such relationship must be evalu-
ated on the facts and circumstances of each individual case." (citation omitted)); Denison State
Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 691-96, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (1982) (holding bank under
no duty to provide customers with information not specifically requested and otherwise readily
available); Klein, 293 Minn. at 421-22, 196 N.W.2d at 622-23 (holding no duty "unless special
circumstances exist, such as where the bank knows or has reason to know that the customer is
placing his trust and confidence in the bank and is relying on the bank so to counsel and
inform him").
118. Klein, 293 Minn. at 421-22, 196 N.W.2d at 622-23; see supra note 117.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1976).
120. Id. § 551.
121. Id. § 525.
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rate. For example, a statement that an obligation accrues interest at
18% per annum would be a misrepresentation if in fact interest accrues
at 181/4% per annum through use of the 365/360 method.
The misrepresentation element may prove difficult when challenging
the bank method under a fraudulent misrepresentation theory. When the
loan is the subject of a correctly prepared Truth in Lending Act disclo-
sure form, it may be impossible to show misrepresentation because the
correct annual percentage rate will be disclosed on the form, even if the
interest rate as stated on the note is deceptive.122 In other situations a
lender may escape liability when ambiguity is based in a finding of indus-
try custom and usage or because the wording itself is open to two inter-
pretations. Notably, however, the ambiguous representation may still be
fraudulent if the bank knows that it is "capable of two interpretations,"
one true and the other false, and the bank makes the representation
"with the intention that it be understood in the sense in which it is false,
... without any belief or expectation as to how it will be understood,...
[or] with reckless indifference as to how it will be understood."
'123
The reliance element may also prove difficult when challenging the
bank method under a fraudulent misrepresentation theory. The bank
could argue that in order to recover the plaintiff must show knowledge of
the different methods of interest calculation and reliance on the use of the
365/365 method to the exclusion of the 365/360 method, all from the
bare per annum interest statement. Such a challenge misapprehends the
nature of the reliance test, however. Reliance should be viewed from the
borrower's perspective, with the stated interest rate considered using the
commonly held meaning of the words "per annum" to set an amount of
interest due. It is not necessary for the borrower to understand the
mechanics of the theoretical alternatives to rely upon the common mean-
ing of the words. It is sufficient for the plaintiff to show reliance on the
annual percentage rate stated in the note as a cap on interest in any cal-
endar year equal to the product of the nominal rate and the principal
balance without having to demonstrate a knowledge of the various alter-
native interest calculation methods. Thus, reliance on the stated nominal
rate in a non-Truth in Lending Act transaction should be presumed.124
The action for tortious nondisclosure is possible, of course, only if
the relevant fact-in this case the use of the 365/360 method of interest
122. See infra note 143.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 527(a)-(c) (1976).
124. The situation with respect to a Truth in Lending Act transaction is more complex
because the required disclosure form presents a nominal interest rate, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18
& 226 app. H (1991), which would differ from that on the note, perhaps putting the borrower
on notice that further inquiry is required.
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calculation-is undisclosed. Thus, it is inapplicable to cases in which the
loan documents contain a disclosure. As to situations in which the bank
makes no disclosure, this cause of action adds several elements of proof
that may be difficult to satisfy. Specifically, the undisclosed fact must be
"a fact that [the nondisclosing party] knows may justifiably induce the
other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction." '125 It is, of
course, not at all clear that the disclosure of the 365/360 method of inter-
est calculation, which is in economic terms an increase of less than 1.4%
of the nominal rate, would induce even a few borrowers to abandon
transactions.
Additionally, liability may exist for tortious nondisclosure "if, but
only if, [the nondisclosing party] is under a duty to the other to exercise
reasonable care to disclose the matter in question." '126 Such a duty exists
if the borrower establishes "a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust
and confidence."' 27 In the alternative, there is liability if the undisclosed
interest calculation method was a fact "known to [the nondisclosing
party] that [it] knows to be necessary to prevent [its] partial or ambigu-
ous statement of the facts from being misleading."' 28 If the disclosed
information is, for example, simply that "the principal balance will ac-
crue interest at the rate of 18% per annum," the fact that under the 365/
360 method interest will actually accrue at an effective rate of 181/4% per
annum is clearly known by the bank to be necessary to prevent its state-
ment from being misleading. Assuming that the plaintiff credibly can
argue that she would not have borrowed or would have borrowed else-
where, if a full disclosure had been made, an action for tortious nondis-
closure may lie. Unfortunately, however, this strategy requires
individually particularized proof, which inhibits class litigation and
raises the cost of prosecuting claims to impossibly high levels.' 2 9
The marginal utility of federal statutory and common-law actions in
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 551(1) (1976).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 551(2)(a).
128. Id. § 551(2)(b).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 133-39. Both breach of fiduciary duty and fraud
cases also offer the advantage of punitive damages. Such actions are particularly attractive
since they contain an element of deterrence against nondefendants similarly situated to the
defendant, and because the wealth of the defendant may be considered in establishing the
amount of the award. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977). The Restatement
notes that
[p]unitive damages are damages... awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future... Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, be-
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.
In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of
[Vol. 70
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challenging the 365/360 method is aggravated by the difficulty of achiev-
ing a procedural posture that will yield broadly applicable relief. The
obvious, although not the only, 3' candidate is class action litigation. 3 '
the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defend-
ant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
Id. § 908(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
130. A result with general applicability can be achieved short of a class action through the
use of offensive issue preclusion, although the mechanism is distinctly less efficient. To qualify,
the claims must not require substantial individualized proof, the fundamental issue decided
must be substantively dispositive of numerous cases, and the initial case must be resolved in
such a way as to permit the offensive use of the fundamental issue decided. In such a situation,
subsequent litigants would be able to avoid retrying the fundamental issue and would be able
to expedite their cases. In 365/360 method claims, however, the individually modest claims
might not be of sufficient magnitude to justify such sequential litigation, even if the fundamen-
tal issue was conclusively decided as a matter of law.
131. Courts have recognized the practical importance of allowing class litigation in 365/
360 interest calculation cases, see, eg., Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442,
454, 591 P.2d 51, 59, 153 Cal. Rptr. 28, 35 (1979) ("[l]n the absence of [a class action] remedy,
consumers who have been defrauded by a defendant's unlawful trade practice frequently would
be effectively denied any realistic remedy and a wrongdoing defendant would often-be totally
insulated from any damage claim."), and in cases involving analogous claims against financial
institutions, see, eg., McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 33 Cal. 3d
816, 823, 662 P.2d 916, 921, 191 Cal. Rptr. 458, 463 (1983) (dealing with the practice of
compounding interest); Kronisch v. Howard Say. Inst., 133 N.J. Super. 124, 131-32, 335 A.2d
587, 591 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (class action for recovery of interest on tax escrow funds
for residential mortgages), modified on remand, 143 N.J. Super. 423, 427, 363 A.2d 376, 378
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (concluding that trial court's certification of a class action was
premature and adopting a "test case" approach).
In McConnell, for example, the court held illegal a practice of compounding interest with-
out a clear written expression of the method of calculation. McConnell, 33 Cal. 3d at 823, 662
P.2d at 921, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 463. The court observed that
[i]f each borrower's understanding of the language used in a lending agreement were
admissible as an aid to "interpreting" its meaning, a cause of action for violation of
[state usury law] would often be rendered inappropriate for prosecution as a class
action. The result would be that lenders who violated [state usury law] would be
shielded from liability to a very substantial number of borrowers whose only practi-
cal recourse to recover for violation of the section would be their participation in a
class action.
Id. And in considering a class action claim for recovery of interest on tax escrow funds, the
court in Kronisch, 133 N.J. Super. at 131-32, 335 A.2d at 591, wrote:
The courts have been generally receptive to the class action concept. "The class
action rule should be liberally construed, and such an action should be permitted
unless there is a clear showing that it is inappropriate or improper." It has been
recognized as a particularly useful device in the area of consumer litigation, and has
been utilized in controversies between mortgagors and their mortgagee banks. An
element common to such actions is the existence of a claim too small to warrant
action by the individual members of the aggrieved class. "If each victim were remit-
ted to an individual suit, the remedy could be illusory, for the individual loss may be
too small to warrant a suit or the victim too disadvantaged to seek relief. Thus the
wrongs would go without redress, and there would be no deterence [sic] to further
aggressions. If there is to be relief, a class action should lie unless it is clearly
infeasible."
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Borrowers have tried to bring class actions on a number of different sub-
stantive theories, with some success in surviving challenges to class certi-
fication. 132 The high-water mark of class challenges to the bank method
was the analysis of Judge Orinda Evans in Kleiner v. First National
Bank.133 Rather than allow defendants to use the extraordinarily specu-
lative contract interpretation analysis to introduce individualized ele-
ments of proof and thereby defeat the certification of class actions, Judge
Evans found a well-reasoned middle ground between allowing unwieldy
class litigation of individualized claims and permitting defendants to de-
feat class claims based on tenuous points requiring individualized proof.
Judge Evans began by noting that the presence of some individual ques-
tions will not defeat class certification if common questions
predominate.13 1 She then applied this basic principle of class-action liti-
gation to the facts of Kleiner:
When viewed in light of Rule 23, claims arising from inter-
pretations of a form contract appear to present the classic case
for treatment as a class action, and breach of contract cases are
routinely certified as such.... In this case, putative class mem-
bers signed identical or similar form agreements, all of which
present the question of the meaning of such terms as "prime
rate," "best and most creditworthy commercial borrowers,"
"per annum," and "360-day year simple interest basis." The
Id. (quoting Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 225, 294 A.2d 7, 10 (1972)) (cita-
tions omitted).
132. See American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980, 982 (9th Cir.
1973) (allowing class litigation of 365/360-based usury claims), cert denied, 421 U.S. 921
(1975); Fletcher, 23 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 591 P.2d at 55, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (allowing class
litigation of statutory, but not contract, claims); Perlman v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 III. App. 3d
784, 804, 305 N.E.2d 236, 251-52 (1973) (holding no abuse of discretion to permit class action
where statutory claim is made and "custom and usage" is not available as a defense), appeal
dismissed, 60 Ill. 2d 529, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975) (dismissed on recusal of two supreme court
justices); O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 688, 586 P.2d 830, 834-35
(1978) (allowing class action on usury claims against brokerage house for use of 365/360
method on margin accounts).
Courts also have indicated approval of class litigation of such claims in theory, while
denying class certification for lack of a proper class representative, see Fletcher, 23 Cal. 3d at
454, 591 P.2d at 59, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (dismissal of damage claims upheld where named
plaintiff knew of use of 365/360 method prior to closing on basis of named plaintiff not being a
proper class representative), or the existence of atypical defenses against the named plaintiff,
see Koos v. First Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1974) (class action standing in
365/360 method usury case denied where plaintiffs were atypical given defense that usury
statute did not apply to given loan).
A class analysis has been used as a device to permit the recovery of attorney fees. See
Silverstein v. Shadow Lawn Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 N.J. 30, 45, 237 A.2d 474, 482 (1968) (case
treated as spurious class action to provide counsel fee to plaintiffs' attorneys).
133. 97 F.R.D. 683, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
134. Id. at 691-93.
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meaning of these terms is the predominant issue in the case and
is an issue common to all class members.
135
Judge Evans did not hold that no individualized questions were
presented in the case; she merely held that those questions were not sub-
stantial enough to bar class certification.
136
Judge Evans excluded individualized proof and facilitated class con-
sideration of the challenge to the 365/360 method in several other ways.
First, she rejected the bank's offer of parol evidence on the construction
of the loan agreements, holding that as a basic matter of contract inter-
pretation parol evidence is not appropriate unless the contracts are pa-
tently ambiguous, which was not the case.
[T]o presume ... that the meaning of a contract will always
turn on the state of mind of the parties is inconsistent with fun-
damental principles of contract interpretation. Here the parties
have entered standard written contracts containing terms that
have an objective meaning.... The Court's primary task is to
construe the terms of the contract as written; parol evidence of
the parties' subjective intent, or of a prior course of dealings,
would be inadmissible unless the contract were patently
ambiguous. 
137
Second, Judge Evans held that a custom-and-usage defense could be de-
termined in a class setting, without proof of the individual plaintiffs' sub-
jective understandings.
In any event, the inquiry into usage of trade is not inconsistent
with class treatment. As stated, usage of trade is imported into
a contract where it is universal to the extent that individuals are
deemed to have knowledge of it. If the words in Plaintiffs'
agreements have come to have a particular meaning defined by
reference to their usage in the industry, that meaning would be
the same regardless of any individual's subjective under-
standing.
3 1
Finally, the judge noted that the danger of inconsistent findings provided
a strong policy argument in favor of determining these issues in a class
action, because "it would be unsound as a matter of public policy to
decide broadly that a form loan contract issued by a bank is to be inter-
preted differently in individual cases. Public policy dictates that such
contracts be given uniform interpretation throughout a given loan mar-
135. Id. at 692 (citations omitted).
136. Id. ("That individual questions may remain after interpretation of the contract-ques-
tions of damages or possible defenses to individual claims-would not defeat the commonality
requirement.").
137. Id. at 693.
138. Id. at 694 (citations omitted).
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ket."' 9 Predictably, given the bank's inability to prevent a decision on
the merits through the use of procedural barriers to litigation, the Kleiner
case settled. 40
Thus, the litigation option has not failed entirely. Some plaintiffs
have been successful in individual cases before judges willing to apply
procedural rules to facilitate, rather than frustrate, the adjudication of
class claims. Unfortunately, such judges are few. That isolated successes
have not caused widespread change in banking practice indicates that
litigation does not provide a solution to the problem.
B. Disclosure Regulation
Regulatory control of the 365/360 method has been pursued only
once at the federal level, indirectly and ultimately without success.' 4 '
139. Id.
140. See Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1199 (11th Cir. 1985).
141. This section does not consider directly the state-by-state prohibition of the 365/360
method, which would have to be accomplished to make the regulatory approach workable. It
should be noted that some states already prohibit the use of the 365/360 method for some
transactions. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1802.20(a)-(b) (West 1985) (allowing only 365/365
and 360/360 as simple interest basis calculations for retail installment sales contracts, for pre-
1988 loans only); id. § 2981(n) (West Supp. 1991) (parallel provision for automobile sales con-
tracts); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 5415(d) (Smith-Hurd 1991) (allowing only 365/365
method for consumer installment loans); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 48.185(3) (West 1988) (open-
end loans); id. § 51A.385(2)(d) ("computed on the basis of a 365-day year"); id. § 56.131(l)(d)
(West Supp. 1991) (allowing 365/365 as alternative to 360/360 for regulated loans); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-106(2) (1989) ("In the computation of interest for a period of less than 1
year, 365 days constitute a year."); NEv. REv. STAT. § 675-363.1 (1985) (allowing either 365/
365 or 360/360 for installment loans); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 397-A:14 (1990) (allowing use
of either 365/365 or 360/360 method for nondepository first mortgage bankers); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:3B-17 (West 1991) (providing that a year is 365 days in closed-end credit situation);
id. § 17:10-14 ("interest [on loans not exceeding $15,000] shall be charged for the actual
number of days elapsed at the daily rate of 1/365 of the yearly rate"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 41a(d)(1) (Supp. 1990) (providing a 365 or 366 day year for closed-end accounts, loans or
extensions of credit); id. tit. 8, § 2223(b) (licensed lenders' year equals 365 days).
Furthermore, versions of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code in both 1968, see UNIp.
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3.201(3), (4)(a), 3.508(4), 7 U.L.A. 729, 773 (1968), and in
1974, see id. §§ 2.201(4), 2.202(3), 2.401(1), (4), 7A U.L.A. 62, 68, 79, 80 (1974), contain
partial prohibitions, at least in the use of the 365/360 method, to skirt the applicable finance
charge limits. These uniform codes are less than perfect vehicles, however, since they parallel
the narrow scope of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r
(1988), by including within their coverage only loans that are "primarily for a personal, family,
household, or agricultural purpose," made to individuals, and generally in an amount not
exceeding $25,000. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3.104(l)(a),(b), 1.301(11), 7 U.L.A.
722-23, 623 (1968); id. §§ 1.301(15)(a)(ii), 1.301(29), 1.202(1), 7A U.L.A. 43, 47, 35 (1974).
The 1968 Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been adopted, with modifications, by only eight
jurisdictions: Colorado, Guam, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 7 U.L.A. 186 (Supp. 1991). The 1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been
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The Truth in Lending Act 42 does not prohibit use of the 365/360
method of interest calculation; it simply attempts to standardize the dis-
closure of credit terms to facilitate comparisons of credit options. 43 In
at least one case, Truth in Lending Act disclosures proved a barrier to a
borrower challenging the bank method. In Chern v. Bank of America 144
the plaintiff noticed a discrepancy between the nominal interest rate a
bank representative quoted her and the interest rate that appeared in the
Truth in Lending Act disclosure form. The difference was due to the
bank's use of a 365/360 method of interest calculation. 45 The bank of-
ficer "briefly explained" the use of the 365/360 method at the closing,' 46
the borrower noted her objection, 47 and then elected to proceed with the
closing.14 Based on the plaintiff's knowledge prior to the closing, sum-
mary judgment was entered for the defendant bank on the borrower's
breach of contract claim. 49 Thus, the disclosure pursuant to the Truth
in Lending Act actually precluded the plaintiff from prevailing. 50
Banks might argue that Chern simply demonstrates that Truth in
adopted, with modifications, by only four states: Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, and Maine. 7A U.L.A.
1 (Supp. 1991).
One state, Maryland, has a statutory provision that must have been drafted by a lender's
lobbyist with an extraordinarily perverse sense of humor; it allows the lender to select any
length of year it desires, from 360 to 366 days. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-1003(b)(2)
(1990) ("For purposes of this section [governing closed-end credit extensions and limiting in-
terest to 24% per annum], a year may be any period of from 360 to 366 days, including or
disregarding the effect of leap year, as the credit grantor may determine.").
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614, 1631-1646, 1661-1665a, 1666-1666j, 1667-1667e (1988).
143. Id. § 1601(a). Under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Lending
Act, the nominal annual percentage rate for a closed-end transaction is determined "by multi-
plying the unit-period rate by the number of unit-periods in a year," 12 C.F.R. § 226 app. J
§ (b)(1) (1991), under which either a 360/360 method or a 365/365 method might be used.
The nominal interest rate under the 365/360 method could not be used in the Appendix J
calculations, at least directly, although the same result could be obtained through adjustment
of the nominal rate and use of the 365/365 method.
144. 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976).
145. Id. at 870, 544 P.2d at 1312, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 112. At a 9% nominal annual rate the
use of the 365/360 method will result in a 9.125% effective rate. See infra note 153.
146. Chern, 15 Cal. 3d at 870, 544 P.2d at 1312, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 874, 544 P.2d at 1314-15, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15. The trial court also dis-
missed the plaintiff's damage claim for false or misleading statements because the applicable
California statute did not provide for individual damages in such cases. Id. at 875, 544 P.2d at
1315, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
150. Following the dismissal of the damages claims the plaintiff was no longer typical of
the class. Therefore, the trial court dismissed the class action for want of a proper representa-
tive plaintiff. The trial court also dismissed the request for injunctive relief, which dismissal
was reversed by the California Supreme Court. The dismissal of the damage claim and the
class action were sustained. Id.
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Lending Act disclosures work. After all, the plaintiff did notice the dis-
crepancy at closing between the quoted nominal rate and the rate dis-
closed under the Act. Such a sanguine view of Chern, however, is
unjustified. First, it was not the Truth in Lending Act disclosure that
put the plaintiff on notice of the practice. The plaintiff in Chern came to
the closing having sued another bank previously under the same the-
ory.'51 There is a substantial question as to whether Truth in Lending
Act disclosure puts a typically knowledgeable borrower on notice of the
365/360 practice. In my practice experience of over a decade, I observed
that loan officers typically responded to borrower concern over the dis-
crepancy between the agreed upon nominal rate and the rate quoted in
the Truth in Lending disclosure form by noting-quite correctly-that
the Truth in Lending Act includes as part of the finance charge, which is
used in calculation of the annual percentage rate disclosed, some one-
time origination charges and other charges.1 52 If a question arose (and in
my experience that was atypical) the loan officer would then give a cur-
sory but accurate explanation of the Truth in Lending Act requirements
and direct the borrower to the note, which contained the "correct" inter-
est rate and, perhaps more importantly, the "correct" payment terms.
Second, in some cases the difference between the quoted per annum
interest rate and the effective interest rate due to the use of the 365/360
method will not show up on the Truth in Lending Act disclosure. In
certain instances, the magnitude of the discrepancy is within the margin
of error permitted under the applicable regulations. 153
151. Id. at 871, 544 P.2d at 1313, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 113,
152. Included is "any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit
[but not] of a type payable in a comparable cash transaction," including, but not limited to,
interest, service charges, some points, loan fees, appraisal fees, premiums for credit life insur-
ance, and liability insurance premiums. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)-(b) (1991).
153. Changes in the regulations have limited this problem. The applicable regulations al-
low for a margin of error of a fraction of a percentage point above or below the actual annual
percentage rate calculated in accordance with the regulations. Until October 1, 1982, the al-
lowable margin of error was one-fourth of one percentage point for both "open end credit
accounts," id § 226.5(a) (1980) (amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 20,892, 20,900 (1981), codified as
amended at 12 C.F.R. § 226.14(a) (1991)), and "extension[s] of credit, other than open end
credit," id. § 226.5(b)(1) (1980) (amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 20,892, 20,904 (1981), codified as
amended at 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a) (1991)). Under the present regulations for both open-end
credit transactions, see id § 226.14(a) (1991), and closed-end credit transactions, see id.
§ 226.22(a)(2), the annual percentage rate disclosed "shall be considered accurate if it is not
more than 1/8 of 1 percentage point above or below the annual percentage rate" calculated
under the regulations. An exception is made for "irregular" closed-end transactions, which
include "one or more of the following features: multiple advances, irregular payment periods,
or irregular payment amounts." Id. § 226.22(a)(3) n.46. For such transactions, the one-fourth
of one percentage point standard is retained. Id. § 226.22(a)(3).
The deviation between the nominal interest rate using the 365/360 and 365/365 methods
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Finally, even armed with her superior knowledge and an apparently
strong desire to modify the interest calculation term, Ms. Chern lacked
the bargaining power to convince the bank to recast the transaction in
terms of a 365/365 method of interest calculation.154 If the goal of dis-
closure regulation is to give borrowers information so that they can act
upon it to their advantage, the system is irretrievably flawed by the in-
ability of the borrower to act once disclosure is made.
Disclosure regulation has failed to inform the public adequately of
the practice of calculating interest on the 365/360 basis, much less end
the practice. Indeed, the disclosure regime has provided a shield for
banks in some cases. Disclosure regulation is not adequate to redress this
situation.
C. Prohibition
The most direct and straightforward means of eliminating the 365/
360 method of interest calculation would be a federal statutory or regula-
tory prohibition. Because the bank method is used by banks and savings
and loans chartered by federal and state law, multiple initiatives are
required.
First, Congress should amend Subchapter IV of the National Bank
Act'55 by inserting a new section 85a that would prospectively prohibit
the use of the 365/360 method of interest calculation, subject only to an
exception for existing loans (including nonbank-discretionary rollovers of
existing loans) for which the use of the 365/360 method was clearly and
prominently disclosed in the documentation or for which the bank
proved through other evidence that the borrower had understood and
agreed to the term. 1 6 Additionally, an amendment of subchapter IV,
section 86 is needed to define the prohibited use of the bank method of
is not greater than one-eighth of a percentage point at any nominal rate up to and including
9% per annum. At 9% the effective interest rate is 0.09 X 365/360 = 0.09125 = 9.125%.
The deviation is not greater than one-fourth of a percentage point at any nominal rate up to
and including 18% per annum (at 18% the effective interest rate is 0.18 X 365/360 = .1825
- 18.25%).
154. See Chern, 15 Cal. 3d at 870, 544 P.2d at 1312, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
155. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12, 19, and 31 U.S.C.). Subchapter IV is found at 12 U.S.C. §§ 81-95b (1988 & Supp.
1 1990).
156. The new section, Title 12, Chapter 2, Subchapter IV, § 85a would read:
85a. PROHIBITION OF USURIOUS INTEREST CALCULATION METHOD.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) hereof, no association may take, re-
ceive, reserve, or charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of
exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest calculated using 365 unit-periods in a
year (or 366 unit-periods in a leap year) and a unit-period rate of interest equal to I/
360th of any quoted nominal annual interest rate (the "365/360 method of interest
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interest calculation as usury. 15 7 Subchapter IV of the National Bank Act
calculation"); and the taking, receiving, reserving or charging of such interest shall
be considered usurious, subject to the penalties of section 86 of this title.
(b) For purposes of this section, a "quoted nominal annual interest rate" shall
mean any annual rate of interest quoted to the borrower in any communication by
the association, including advertisements, oral representations, written representa-
tions, or written loan documents.
(c) It shall be no defense to any action at law brought hereunder that the associ-
ation conforms with the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. Chapter 41, and has disclosed an Annual Percentage Rate either including an
adjustment for the 365/360 method of interest calculation or within the statutorily
allowable margin of error for such Annual Percentage Rate disclosure.
(d) Excepted from the prohibition in (a) shall be loans, notes, bills of exchange
and other evidence of debt which the association establishes are both (1) made and
entered into as of the effective date of this section (including replacement or substi-
tute loans, notes, bills of exchange and other evidence of debt which the obligee is
conditionally or unconditionally required as of the effective date of this section to
extend), and (2) qualify under either (A) or (3) hereof:
(A) Where such loans, notes, bills of exchange or other evidence of debt are
evidenced by a writing as of the effective date of this section that gives adequate
notice of the use of the 365/360 method of interest calculation. For purposes of
this section "adequate notice" means a printed notice that sets forth the perti-
nent facts clearly and conspicuously so that a person against whom it is to oper-
ate could reasonably be expected to have noticed it and understood its meaning.
A writing shall not be deemed to give adequate notice of the use of the 365/360
method of interest calculation solely by stating that "interest will be calculated
on the basis of a 360 day year," that "interest will be calculated on the basis of a
banker's customary short year," that "interest will be calculated according to
bank rules and regulations," or that "interest will be calculated as customary,"
or words to such effect.
(B) Where the association and the borrower have agreed on the use of the 365/
360 method of interest calculation; the agreement of the borrower under this
clause cannot be shown by proof of an industry custom and usage or similar
non-borrower-specific pattern of dealing.
The proposed statutory language uses the definition of "quoted nominal annual interest rate"
and the provisions of new subsection (c) to broaden the inquiry beyond merely whether the
association correctly calculates the annual percentage rate for the purposes of Truth in Lend-
ing Act disclosures, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988), and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.14(a), 226.22(a)(2) (1991). Fairness for lenders is assured by
allowing existing obligations to be calculated using the 365/360 method of interest calculation
if the lender can establish that there was adequate notice (the adequate notice definition paral-
lels that in the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(j) (1988)), or can in any
other borrower-specific way demonstrate the agreement of the parties. Note that this excep-
tion is expanded to include non-lender-discretionary rollover or extension obligations.
157. The revised section, Title 12, Chapter 2, Subchapter IV, § 86, would read:
§ 86 USURIOUS INTEREST; PENALTY FOR TAKING; LIMITATIONS. The taking, re-
ceiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by section 85
of this title, or the taking, receiving, reserving, or charging of interest calculated using
the 365/360 method of interest calculation, as prohibited by section 85a of this title,
when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the
note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be
paid thereon. In case the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom
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is a logical legislative vehicle for prohibiting the 365/360 method because
it locates this prohibition with other provisions regulating the banking
business of national banks, and ties the prohibition of the bank method
into existing enforcement mechanisms and penalties. Such an amend-
ment of the National Bank Act is not alone sufficient, however, in that it
would apply only to the institutions regulated by Chapter 2 of Title 12,
thereby excluding state-chartered financial institutions and possibly ex-
cluding federally chartered financial institutions other than national
banks.' Clearly, it would be prudent separately to prohibit state-
it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back, in an action in the
nature of an action of debt, twice the amount of the interest thus paid from the
association taking or receiving the same: Provided, That such action is commenced
within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred.
12 U.S.C. § 86 (1988) (proposed additions in italics).
158. The sweep of the National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat, 99 (1864) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. I. 1990)), has been the source of judicial
confusion. It is provided in 12 U.S.C. § 37 that the provisions: of 12 U.S.C. Chapter 2 "which
are expressed without restrictive words, as applying to 'national banking associations,' or to
'associations,' apply to all associations organized to carry on the business of banking under any
Act of Congress." 12 U.S.C. § 37 (1988). The sections under discussion, §§ 85 & 86, are
within chapter 2 of Title 12 and are cast in terms of "[a]ny association," and "the association."
Id. §§ 85, 86. These sections are therefore within the operation of 12 U.S.C. § 37.
It has been correctly held that the National Bank Act does not apply to state-chartered
institutions. See Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Yet the Weiner court was imprecise in its formulation: "The National Bank Act regulates
national banks and only national banks, which can be identified by the word 'national' in their
name," an imprecision which was not outcome determinative given the facts of that particular
case. Id. at 687, 690-92 (basing plaintiff's lack of standing on the fact that he had not entered
into any credit transaction with the state bank defendant). Unfortunately, and notwithstand-
ing the clear language of § 37, Weiner has been cited for the proposition that the National
Bank Act does not govern the activities of the Production Credit Associations and the Federal
Land Banks. See Wiley v. Federal Land Bank, 657 F. Supp. 964, 965 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (citing
Weiner and Criswell v. Production Credit Ass'n, 660 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Ohio 1985), as support
for this proposition); Criswell, 660 F. Supp. at 16 ("Neither PCA nor FLB are established as
national banks under the National Bank Act[;] rather both are instrumentalities created under
the Farm Credit Act of 1971.... It is well settled that the National Bank Act regulates only
the conduct of national banks.") (citing Weiner as support). Wiley and Criswell were wrongly
decided if the Federal Land Banks and the Production Credit Associations are "associations
organized to carry on the business of banking under any Act of Congress," within the meaning
of 12 U.S.C. § 37. The issue has been properly framed and addressed once, at the district court
level, with the finding that "[t]he Production Credit Association is not engaged in general
banking, but is an organization under the Farm Credit Association which is designed to serve a
particular, limited purpose." Beatrice Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Vieselmeyer, 376 F. Supp. 1391,
1392 (D. Neb. 1973). The factual conclusion is not beyond dispute, given that the Federal
Land Banks and the Production Credit Associations are part of the integrated "Farm Credit
System" created under Chapter 23 of Title 12 of the United States Code. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001 to
2279aa-14 (1988 & Supp. I 1990). However, § 2205 of Title 12, which exempts Farm Credit
System institutions from state interest rate limitations, provides some inferential support. Id.
§ 2205 (1988) ("[I]nterest rates on loans from institutions of the Farm Credit System shall not
be subject to any.., limitation imposed by any state constitution or statute or other laws.").
A similar uncertainty surrounds the status of federal credit unions under 12 U.S.C. § 37.
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chartered institutions, and federal financial institutions other than na-
tional banks, from using the 365/360 method of interest calculation.15 9
An alternative federal legislative strategy would be to amend the
Truth in Lending Act"6 to prohibit use of the bank method. Such a
strategy is distinctly inferior to the comprehensive amendments proposed
above. An initial objection to prohibition through the Truth in Lending
Act is that, by its terms, the Truth in Lending Act institutes a disclosure
regime to facilitate comparisons of credit alternatives by consumers, not
a system of prohibition to regulate the credit options available. 161 This
objection is incorrect. The 365/360 method of interest calculation is
mathematically indistinguishable in every case from use of the 365/365
method with a nominal interest rate slightly less than 1.4% greater than
the nominal rate using the 365/360 method. The use of the 365/360
method in some cases and the 365/365 method in others requires poten-
tial borrowers to recognize the use of the different formulas and perform
a reasonably complex calculation in order to make the two options com-
parable. Standardization on the 365/365 method removes this barrier to
comparison and facilitates sound credit decisions without limiting in any
way the substantive outcomes to which the parties can bargain.
A more powerful objection to prohibition of the bank method
through amendment of the Truth in Lending Act is that the scope of
coverage of the Act is relatively narrow. Excluded from coverage are
The usury section of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 86, has been held applicable to fed-
eral credit unions. See Van Pelt v. P & L Fed. Credit Union, 39 Tenn. App. 363, 378, 282
S.W.2d 794, 800-01 (1955). It is also inapplicable by inference, since there is another section of
the statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(vii) (1988), that outlines usury requirements applicable to
federal credit unions. See Knights of Columbus Fed. Credit Union v. Salisbury, 3 Conn. App.
201, 206-07, 486 A.2d 649, 654 (1985).
159, State regulation presumably would be a matter of individual state statutory or admin-
istrative rule modification. Among the federal statutes that would require attention would be
the chapters of Title 12 regarding: the Export-Import Bank, 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(b) (Supp. I
1990); Agricultural Marketing, id. § 1441d-1 (1988); the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration, id. § 1454 (Supp. I 1990) (setting standards for purchasable mortgages); Federal
Savings and Loan Associations, id. § 1464(c) (setting standards for loans and investments);
Federal Credit Unions, id. § 1757(5)(A)(vi)-(vii) (1988); the Farm Credit System, id. § 2205
(system-wide exemption from state interest rate limitations); and the National Consumer Co-
operative Bank, id. § 3018(b) (criteria for interest rates on loans made by the Bank).
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614, 1631-1646, 1661-1665a, 1666-1666j, 1667-1667e (1988).
161. Thus, the congressional findings and declaration of purpose for subehapter I of Chap-
ter 41, Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure, provide that
[i]t is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.
Id. § 1601(a).
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loans for business and commercial purposes, 162 loans other than to indi-
viduals,1 63 and loans over $25,000 other than a mortgage loan on the
borrower's principal residence.'" Because of the limited scope of cover-
age and the arguable departure from the legislative thrust of the chapter,
amending the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit the 365/360 method is a
disfavored alternative that is best considered an interim or compromise
measure.
A third regulatory option would be for the various federal financial
institution regulators to declare the use of the 365/360 method an unsafe
and unsound practice. 65 Such a declaration would need to be framed
aggressively, given the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gulf Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board.166 That case in-
volved the well-publicized, but ultimately unsuccessful, effort of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board to regulate the Gulf Federal Savings and
Loan Association. 67 The savings and loan had a pattern and practice of
contracting with borrowers to charge interest on a 365/365 basis and
then calculating interest based on a 365/360 method.1 68  The Federal
Home Loan Bank Board classified this as a breach of contract and an
unsafe and unsound practice.'69 The Fifth Circuit held that the Board's
cease-and-desist order was improper because the Board's ability to act on
the basis of "unsafe or unsound practices" relates only to conditions that
threaten an institution's financial integrity. 7 Further, the court held
162. Section 1603(1) of Title 15 exempts "[c]redit transactions involving extensions of
credit primarily for business, commercial, or agricultural purposes." Id. § 1603(1).
163. Section 1603(1) of Title 15 excludes "[c]redit transactions involving extensions of
credit ... to organizations," id. § 1603(1) (emphasis added), which is defined to mean "a
corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership, co-
operative, or association." Id. § 1602(c).
164. Section 1603(3) excludes "[c]redit transactions, other than those in which a security
interest is or will be acquired in real property, or in personal property used or expected to be
used as the principal dwelling of the consumer, in which the total amount financed exceeds
$25,000." Id. § 1603(3).
165. Such regulations presumably would be promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion as successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. 11990), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, pursuant to its authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (Supp. 11990).
166. 651 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
167. See John D. Hawke, Jr., Banking Regulators' Clout Increases Dramatically, LEGAL
TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1982, at 11, 14 (noting that Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n stands for the propo-
sition "that there is a limit to agencies' discretion to define unsafe and unsound practices");
Bank Board Asks Supreme Court for Power to Stop S&L Overcharges, supra note 57, at B-3.
168. Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 261-62.
169. Id. at 263.
170. Id. at 264-66 ("The breadth of the 'unsafe or unsound practice' formula is restricted
... to practices with a reasonably direct effect on an association's financial soundness....
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that giving the Board general supervisory authority "to enforce the pub-
lic's standard of fairness in interpreting contracts" would exceed Con-
gress's intent.1 71  The use of the 365/360 method itself was not
challenged, merely the breach of the agreements to use the 365/365
method. 172 One might speculate on regulators' willingness to repeat its
attempt to regulate this facet of savings-and-loan activities, and the desire
of the courts to block such regulation, given the wholesale failure of fi-
nancial institution deregulation in the intervening years. It does seem
safe to predict, however, that the attentions of regulators will be other-
wise occupied for quite a long time. The unsafe and unsound practice
declaration is therefore also a disfavored alternative to comprehensive
and affirmative prohibition, best considered an interim or compromise
measure.
Prohibition by statute or regulation has the virtue of squarely ad-
dressing the policy question, giving clear direction to lenders, and pro-
tecting borrowers. Prohibition is the preferred avenue for redress of this
situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The bank method of interest calculation ought to offend our sense of
fairness and propriety. It is simply unseemly for a bank to use such a
naked artifice to cheat its customers.
Viewed in isolation, the bank method of interest calculation is a
computational curiosity perhaps not worthy of great attention. After all,
although many are hurt, the individual injuries are slight. Viewed in its
proper context, however, this situation merits attention. In the technical
debate over the calculation of interest, we find yet another frontier of the
legal system's chronic abandonment of the less powerful. The fundamen-
tal policy question underlying this issue is a modest reformulation of that
posed by Attorney Wells in the Ely case: Must the laws of nature and of
humanity always bend to the purposes of the powerful?"7 ' If the legal
system is anything more than rules of etiquette within which the power-
ful can plunder the weak, the answer to the question must be that the
While Gulf Federal's interest calculation provision mix-up is unfortunate, it does not threaten
the association's financial well-being.").
171. Id. at 265.
172. Id. at 261 ("[A]ll parties agree that the 365/360 method is a legitimate means of
calculating interest, and the Bank Board does not challenge Gulf Federal's right to choose to
calculate interest in this way.").
173. New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Ely & Parsons, 2 Cow. 678, 686 (N.Y. 1824) (attorney
Wells arguing for the defendant) ("[Ilf not to any other intent, yet the laws of nature and of
man must bend to the purposes of the money lender.").
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interests of the less powerful should not be so subordinate. One way, a
small way, to affirm the proposition that the law exists in part to protect
the less powerful would be to correct the abuse inherent in the "bankers'
customary short year"174 and protect the people from the insidious bank
method of interest calculation.
174. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Connolly, 176 F.2d 1004, 1010 n.2 (5th Cir. 1949)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (referring to "the bankers' customary short year of 360 days, which
only applies in figuring interest that is charged as compensation for the use or detention of
money").
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